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I. INTRODUCTION TO HEDGE FUNDS
Exceptions from regulation under securities, investment company, 
investment advisory, and tax laws define hedge fund structures and 
distinguish hedge funds from mutual funds.  The exceptions also permit hedge 
funds to (i) utilize substantial economic leverage, (ii) pay their investment 
advisers fees that materially exceed those a mutual fund may pay its 
investment advisers, and (iii) prevent the United States from imposing taxes 
on their foreign investors or collecting a corporate level tax from the fund.  
Promoters of hedge funds design their funds to fit these regulatory exceptions.  
As exceptions change, hedge funds adjust in structure in order to remain 
unregulated.   
Hedge funds are actively managed investments that pool investors’ 
capital in order to acquire, own, and trade one or more of securities, 
commodities, and financial products.  Although the first hedge fund made its 
appearance as early as 1949,1 legal scholarship on hedge funds did not 
materialize until 1966 when the number of funds began to grow.2  During the 
1990s, hedge funds began to capture substantial investment capital from high 
net worth individuals.3  Initially, some funds may have employed hedging 
strategies that suggested they had investment plans to protect capital,4 but 
soon hedge funds evolved into high risk and, so investors hoped, high return 
investment vehicles for entities with excess liquidity and wealthy individuals.  
While some hedge funds still employ hedging strategies in part, especially 
market neutral funds,5 the range of hedge fund strategies no longer relates to 
any fundamental hedging concept.   
Because their investors and investment managers were generally very 
wealthy,6 hedge funds developed mystique, as clubs that limit access to the 
rich and famous tend to do.  Hedge funds and their managers gained the 
reputation of having apparent ability to wield enormous, economic influence 
1 Douglas W. Hawes, Hedge Funds – Investment Funds for the Rich, 23 BUS. LAWYER 576, 
577 (1966-67) (attributing first hedge fund to A.W. Jones & Company in 1949).   
2 Id.; see infra note 37. 
3 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), without reliable data, estimated that 
there were approximately 400 hedge funds in 1992 and, based on the estimates of participants 
in an SEC roundtable on hedge funds, 6000 in 2003.  SEC Staff Report, Implications of the 
Growth of Hedge Funds 1 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf. 
4 A hedge is the purchase of positions that offset each other by moving in opposite value 
directions.  Increase in the value of one position would match decrease in the value of the 
other.  In order to make a profit, the investor would allow some spread, either value or timing, 
between the offsetting positions.   
5 See discussion of hedge fund investment strategies, infra Part 5. 
6 This article uses the terms “investment manager” and “investment adviser” interchangeably 
when referring to hedge fund advisors. 
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that even might threaten the financial stability of the markets.7  But, like those 
clubs for the rich and famous, once allowed to enter, one discovers that what 
is going on inside is expensive but far more mundane than it appeared while 
one waited in line outside the club.  Conversations inside are not more 
interesting; returns from hedge fund investing are sometimes better but often 
the same as or worse than market indices.8
Paucity of publicly available information about hedge funds amplified 
the mystique.  That information scarcity resulted from limitations on the 
SEC’s regulatory authority over hedge funds and their investment managers.  
Generally, neither the funds nor their managers had to register under the 
statutes that give the SEC regulatory oversight over mutual funds9 and their 
investment advisers.10  Except for very large funds with 500 investors or 
more,11 the SEC could not demand information reporting for hedge funds’ 
holdings and investment strategies.   
Periodically, incidents occur in the hedge fund industry affecting 
investors or markets severely and adversely.  The collapse of Long Term 
Capital Management in 1998 is an example of such an incident.12  In 2004, 
Bayou Capital failed and its principals initially dropped from view, leaving 
investors with significant losses.13  The principals later surrendered to 
authorities and pleaded guilty to conspiracy and fraud charges.14  More 
7 The collapse of Long Term Capital Management, an extremely high visibility and heavily 
leveraged hedge fund group, supported this view as the New York Stock Exchange and a 
consortium of investment banks bailed the group out to protect the integrity of the markets.  
See Roger Lowenstein, WHEN GENIUS FAILED:  THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL 
MANAGEMENT (Random House 2000) (relating story of growth and collapse of LTCM); see
Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management – Report of the 
President's Working Group on Financial Markets, by representatives from the Commission, 
the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (Apr. 1999) (examining market crisis that failure of LTCM precipitated). 
8 Mark Kritzman, Portfolio Efficiency with Performance Fees, ECONOMICS AND PORTFOLIO 
STRATEGY NEWSLETTER (Feb. 1, 2007) (emphasizing asymmetry in performance fee structures 
[see discussion of performance fee structures infra in Part 3] as a key contributor to drag on 
investment returns and concluding that allocating one’s portfolio to ten uncorrelated hedge 
funds would be likely to yield a lower return than an allocation to a series of index funds 
because of the high hedge fund fees).  The Standard and Poor’s hedge fund index for 2005 
advanced only 2.3% compared with a 4.9% for the Standard and Poor’s 500 index.  Jenny 
Anderson, By the Numbers:  Hedge Funds and Half Truths, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at C8; 
see Aaron Pressman, Hedge Funds: The Pool is Shrinking, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE (Jan. 19, 
2006), 
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jan2006/nf20060119_7052_db016.htm. 
9 The Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006). 
10 The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2006). 
11 Securities Exchange Act §12(g) requires registration of any fund if it has 500 or more 
owners.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006). 
12 Supra note 7. 
13 Gretchen Morgenson, What Really Happened at Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at C1. 
14 Hedge fund founder, CFO plead guilty in fraud case; Losses estimated at $450 million in 
Bayou scandal, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 30, 2005, at C3. 
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recently, the SEC sued the founders of HMC International for 
misappropriating the fund’s assets to support their lifestyles.15  And in 2003 
the New York State Attorney General filed a complaint against Canary 
Capital Partners accusing it of illegal and fraudulent trading practices for late 
trading of mutual fund shares – a practice benefiting the hedge fund and 
harming the other investors in the mutual funds Canary late traded.16
Such events draw public attention to hedge funds and an occasional 
public outcry for regulation.  However, the outcry is not from hedge fund 
investors nor is it grass roots.  The media generate or respond to that attention 
and outcry with news coverage and commentary, whether the incident injures 
only the hedge fund’s investors or threatens market stability generally.  
However, empirical evidence of correlation between the hedge fund trading 
activities and major movement in the financial markets is lacking.17
Moreover, increased regulation of and oversight over hedge funds has not 
reached the top of Congress’ legislative agenda.  Historically, Congress failed 
to enact legislation regulating hedge funds.  In fact, on several occasions the 
contrary has occurred.  Congress has removed regulatory constraints from the 
hedge fund industry.   
Contrary to Congress’s easing of hedge fund regulation, the SEC 
recently sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to extend mandatory registration under 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to many hedge fund managers.18  The 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the new regulations shortly 
following the date on which managers first had to register under the 
regulations.19  The revised regulations would have altered the manner in 
which an investment advisor counts clients.  Managers who previously did not 
have to register because they had fewer than fifteen clients would have had to 
count each investor in a hedge fund — rather than only the fund itself — as a 
client for purposes of the fewer than fifteen client rule.   
Since the DC Circuit rejected the revisions to the client counting 
rule,20 the SEC could not compel investment advisers to a limited number of 
15 Jenny Anderson, S.E.C. Accuses a New Jersey Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at 
C4. 
16 Complaint available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf.  
Late trading is the purchase after market close of a mutual fund’s shares at the pre-close net 
asset value of the shares rather than the new after close value.  The late trader captures the 
advance in the share price for events that occurred during the day, if any, by buying at the 
previous day’s lower price. 
17 See Barry Eichengreen & Donald Mathieson, Hedge Funds and Financial Markets:  
Implications for Policy in HEDGE FUNDS AND FINANCIAL MARKET DYNAMICS, International 
Monetary Fund Occasional Paper 166, 2, 3 (Washington D.C. 1998). 
18 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Release No. IA-
2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) (adding Reg. § 203(b)(3)-2 requiring investment 
advisers to count the underlying owners of private funds as clients). 
19 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
20 Id. 
Ed. 2] Demystifying Hedge Funds:  A Design Primer 327 
funds to register.  In order to assure greater transparency from investment 
advisers, the SEC promulgated a proposed antifraud regulation that, if adopted 
as a final regulation, would broaden and clarify disclosure requirements 
applicable to registered and unregistered investment advisers to hedge funds 
and other private investment pools.21  The proposed rule renders it unlawful 
for an investment adviser, whether or not registered under the Investment 
Advisers Act to “make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state 
a material fact . . . to any investor or prospective investor in a pooled 
investment vehicle.”22  The proposed regulation also prohibits deceptive or 
manipulative practices.23  However, the proposed regulation is broader than 
the general antifraud rule24 as it applies even if the statement, omission or 
deceptive practice does not accompany the purchase or sale of an interest in 
the pooled investment vehicle or any other security.25
A. Mutual Fund and Hedge Fund Risk and Liquidity Contrasted 
Hedge funds are not mysterious, although trading strategies some 
managers utilize are intricate and complex.26  Hedge funds are simply pooled 
investments designed to avoid regulatory constraints that might inhibit profit 
for the investors and the investment managers.  By avoiding regulation, the 
funds may adopt investment strategies that involve greater risk of loss than 
mutual funds.  Concomitantly, hedge funds historically targeted investors who 
(i) economically could make an investment of $100,000 or more and bear the 
risk of its loss, if loss occurred, (ii) willingly traded greater risk for the chance 
to capture greater rewards, and, as outlined in the next paragraph, (iii) did not 
require the daily redemption liquidity of open–end mutual funds or the public 
trading market for closed–end funds.   
Mutual funds constituting most regulated investment companies come 
in two varieties:  open–end funds and closed–end funds.  Open–end mutual 
funds issue and redeem shares at net asset value per share, as investors invest 
and disinvest.27  Closed–end funds raise capital through offering their shares, 
but redeem the shares only when they dispose of their portfolio positions and 
do not reinvest the proceeds from the sales.  Closed–end fund shares trade on 
exchanges or over the counter with market pricing.28  While share price of 
closed–end funds theoretically ought to track net asset value per share, instead 
21 Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8, 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8 (2007 proposed).  SEC Release 33-
8766, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (Jan. 4, 2007). 
22 Id.  Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8(a)(1).  Compare the language of the general antifraud 
rule under the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5. 
23 Id.  Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8(a)(2). 
24 Rule 10b-5. 
25 Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8 and see discussion of enforcement action in the release 
document, SEC Release 33-8766, supra note 21, at note 26.  
26 See infra Part 5. 
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-4(3), 5(a)(1) (2006).  No other trading market exists for the shares.   
28 Id. §§ 80a-4(3), 5(a)(2). 
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share price often lags net asset value.  With respect to liquidity, open–end 
mutual funds generally allow daily redemption of interests and closed–end 
funds facilitate exchange listing and, accordingly, market trading of shares.29
Open–end mutual funds may have as much as fifteen percent of their net 
assets in restricted securities and other illiquid positions.30  Illiquid positions 
constitute part of the value of the fund and must not impede the fund’s 
redemption of shares that shareholders tender.31  The board of directors of the 
fund must determine the value of the illiquid positions in good faith.32
Hedge funds that invest in the public securities markets customarily 
offer their investors the opportunity to redeem their interests at least annually, 
but rarely more frequently than monthly.  No statute requires the funds to pay 
the redemption amount within any specific period, but most funds seek to pay 
the bulk of the redemption price, often ninety percent, within ten to fifteen 
days of the permissible redemption date.  The remainder of the price follows 
when the fund finally determines its net asset value for the redemption date.  
Depending on the risk profile of the fund, some hedge funds invest in equity 
positions that promise substantial long–term return, but in the interim are 
illiquid.  Sometimes, positions become illiquid because of changes affecting 
the specific issuer of the securities or, more generally, market conditions.   
When a fund holds such illiquid investments, the manager places them 
into a “side pocket,” which is a separate account on the fund’s books.  Funds 
handle their side pockets in a variety of ways:  (i) some funds estimate the 
value of side pocket positions and include a payment for them in the 
redemption price; (ii) more often, funds permit investors to redeem the liquid 
portion of their interests but retain the investor in the fund with respect to the 
investor’s share of illiquid positions; (iii) other funds exclude side pocket 
value from the redemption proceeds for investors wishing to redeem from the 
fund before the illiquid positions are sold, so that the redeeming investor 
simply relinquishes any interest in the side pocket; (iv) in order to avoid harsh 
results, managers occasionally create a separate class of fund interests with 
some investors only sharing in the liquid positions in the fund’s portfolio, 
while others, with a longer–term appetite for commitment, participate in the 
side pocket portion of the fund as well.33
29 Id. § 80a-22(e) (providing limited exceptions for extraordinary market events, prohibiting 
any delay in redemption of tendered shares longer than seven days). 
30 Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, Release Nos. 33-6927, IC-18612, 57 Fed. Reg. 
9,828 (Mar. 20, 1992). 
31 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(e). 
32 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41). 
33 Hedge funds also must isolate their positions in initial equity public offerings, so that 
investors in the hedge fund who are broker-dealers or affiliated with or related to broker-
dealers do not participate in the gain from that portion of the hedge fund’s portfolio.  National 
Association of Securities Dealers Manual Rule 2790, 
http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid=1189&element_id=1159000466. 
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Additionally, there are hedge funds, including venture capital and 
private equity funds that invest almost exclusively in private equities that are 
illiquid.  Those funds often have their own life cycle of two to five years 
during which investors may not withdraw capital.  Private equity funds may 
raise money in anticipation of identifying a single opportunity, for example 
purchase and turn around of a failing business.34  While limited opportunities 
to withdraw invested capital characterizes closed-end mutual funds as well as 
certain hedge funds (and for that matter direct investment in corporations, as 
well), the similarity to such long term capital commitment ends there.  Hedge 
funds lack the active secondary trading market of closed-end mutual funds 
although promoters sometimes will help to place an interest in the fund for an 
investor who wishes to dispose of one.  Recent regulations requiring hedge 
fund managers to register as investment advisors initially motivated some 
managers to require a two year capital commitment for all the funds they 
managed so that the funds would continue to be a single client of the advisor, 
rather than all the owners of the fund being deemed clients for purposes of 
registration under the Advisers Act.35  However, that emerging trend reversed 
following the judicial holding that the regulation was invalid.36
B. Regulatory Frameworks and Article Goals 
While the body of scholarship on hedge funds has increased over the 
past several years,37 the literature offers little by way of a simple explanation 
of the structures that hedge fund promoters utilize and why promoters use 
those structures.38  This article will seek to fill that gap in scholarship by 
34 Something akin to a merchant banking fund. 
35 An Advisors Act Regulation that the DC Circuit overturned in Goldstein v. SEC, supra note 
19, exempted  funds with a two-year minimum lock-up from the look through rule for 
counting advisory clients.  Rules and Regulations, Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 17 
C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(d)(1)(ii) (2006).   
36 Goldstein v. SEC, supra note 19. 
37 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC at 70:  Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds 
and Stock Market Volatility – What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission is 
Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909 (2005) (recommending greater regulatory 
intervention to prevent excessive speculation and avoid market crashes).  See also Laura 
Edwards, Note, Looking through the Hedges:  How the SEC Justified its Decision to Require 
Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers, 83 WASH. U. L. Q. 603 (2005) (explaining and 
discussing origin and purposes of new, but invalidated, rule governing registration of hedge 
fund advisers); Joseph Hellrung, Note & Comment, Emerging Issues in Banking Regulation:  
Hedge Fund Regulation:  Investors are Knocking at the Door, but can the SEC Clean House 
before Everyone Rushes In?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 317 (2005) (examining new rule 
requiring many investment advisers to register);  Rory B. O’Halloran, Comment, An Overview 
and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund Regulation, 79 TUL. L. REV. 461 
(2004) (discussing regulatory proposals affecting hedge funds); Erik J Greupner, Hedge 
Funds Are Headed Down-market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1555 (2003) (discussing trend toward registered hedge funds and regulatory changes). 
38 William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE
331 (1999) (quantitatively describing hedge fund structure and performance and differing as a 
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describing some basic, popular hedge fund structures and explaining the 
regulatory planning that accounts for them.39  The simplest answer to why 
promoters design hedge fund structures to avoid registration under the 
Investment Company Act is that hedge funds permit managers to share 
directly in the fund’s investment gain, while mutual funds do not.40
 The principal U.S. regulatory frameworks that might affect hedge fund 
investing adversely, if fund organizers fail to structure the funds correctly, are 
the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”),41 the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”),42 the Investment Company Act of 1940 
(the “Investment Company Act”),43 the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the 
“Advisers Act”),44 the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (the “Code”),45 and the 
Commodities Exchange Act (the “CEA”).46  Other regulatory structures such 
as state securities law47 and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (“ERISA”)48 sometimes impact the operation of hedge funds.  
 Part 2 of this article describes the structuring of hedge funds to exempt 
them from regulation under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the 
Investment Company Act.  Part 3 explains how the exemption of hedge funds 
from regulation under the Investment Company Act enables the funds’ 
investment advisers to avoid regulation under the Advisers Act but, more 
importantly, to remain free from the limitations on the fees the advisers may 
primer from this article in its very limited description of the reasons for the legal structures 
managers select). 
39 For readers wanting greater detail on hedge funds than this article offers, see Shartsis Friese 
LLP, Douglas L. Hammer, Carolyn S. Reiser, et al., U.S. Regulation of Hedge Funds, 
Business Law (2005). 
40 17 C.F.R. § 275.205.  See discussion infra Part 3. 
41 15 U.S.C. §77a-aa. 
42 Id. §§ 78a-mm.
43 Id. §§ 80a-1 to -64. 
44 Id. §§ 80b-1 to -21. 
45 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9833 (2000).
46 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-27f (2000).  While many hedge funds trade some commodities that the 
Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) regulates, this article will not address 
commodities regulation because commodities regulation has limited impact on the structure of 
hedge funds.  Most hedge funds are exempt from registration under the CEA for the same 
structural reason that they are exempt under the Investment Advisors Act. See Commodity 
Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, app. E (2000); see 
also Sharon Brown-Hruska, Acting Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, Keynote Address at the Securities Industry Association Hedge Funds 
Conference (Nov. 30, 2004), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/speeches04/opabrown-hruska-22.htm 
(arguing that commodities pools are hedge funds and that most hedge fund advisers are 
regulated by the CFTC, either as commodity pool operators or because they trade regulated 
commodities, so that SEC registration of the advisers is unnecessary).  
47 State securities laws are commonly known as Blue-Sky laws and sometimes including 
registration and reporting requirements even when federal law does not. 
48 Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 99 Stat. 829 
(1974); see Shartsis Friese LLP, supra note 39, at 249-265; infra note 270. 
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collect.  Part 4 identifies federal income tax rules that contribute to structural 
choices and result in a mixture of domestic and offshore funds to meet the 
needs of differing classes of investors.  Part 5 discusses hedge fund strategies 
and the importance of leverage.  Part 6 concludes by synthesizing the 
regulatory frameworks to an understanding of the simple fundamental nature 
of hedge funds and briefly explores the question of the need for additional 
regulation of the hedge fund industry.   
II. STRUCTURING HEDGE FUNDS FOR EXEMPTION FROM REGISTRATION 
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS AND THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT
The Investment Company Act49 followed upon the Securities Act50
and the Exchange Act51 and reflects the period of economic uncertainty in 
which Congress enacted it.  The Investment Company Act seems to be a 
product of the great depression that followed the stock market crash of 1929, 
but adopts a somewhat different philosophical approach to investor protection 
than the Securities Act and the Exchange Act.  The Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act sought to protect the investing public by assuring equal access 
to information for all market participants.  The theory underlying disclosure is 
that professional market participants assimilate publicly available information 
and disseminate it to the investing public in more usable form.  In turn, 
investors protect themselves if they have the material information concerning 
the investments.  Mandatory and ongoing information disclosures achieved 
that goal.  Under the Securities Act, an issuer of securities has to disclose a 
broad array of financial and operational information as a condition to entry 
into the public capital markets.52  In order to prevent manipulation of the 
secondary market for an issuer’s outstanding securities, the issuer continually 
must update public information concerning its operations and finances. 53  An 
issuer’s insiders must not trade the issuer’s securities if the insiders have 
information concerning the issuer that is not yet in the public domain.54
A. Investment Company Act and Debt 
While the Investment Company Act similarly relies heavily on the 
disclosure philosophy to protect the public, it is more parental in its regulatory 
protection of investors.  Along with registration, the Investment Company Act 
limits transactions with affiliated persons,55 requires funds to maintain 
49 Pub. L. No 76-768; 54 Stat. 789 (1940). 
50 Pub. L. No. 73-22; 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
51 Pub. L. No. 73-291; 48 Stat. 881 (1934). 
52 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2000). 
53 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2000). 
54 Id. § 10(b); Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
55 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-9, -10, -12, -17 (2006) (respectively covering 
affiliated persons as employees, directors, overlapping ownership, and prohibited 
transactions). 
332 UC Davis Business Law Journal [Vol. 7
sufficient liquidity to redeem shares,56 regulates corporate governance of the 
funds,57 and establishes rules for pricing of the funds’ portfolios.58  Perhaps 
most significantly, the Investment Company Act exhibits a strong bias against 
debt.  Section 1 of the Investment Company Act declares that:59
the national public interest and the interest of investors are 
adversely affected   
(7) when investment companies by excessive borrowing and the 
issuance of excessive amounts of senior securities increase 
unduly the speculative character of their junior securities.60
The purpose of the Investment Company Act is “to mitigate and . . . 
eliminate” those conditions that adversely affect the public.61  As a result of 
the bias against indebtedness in the Investment Company Act, a fundamental 
distinction between investments required to register under the Investment 
Company Act and investments free from the registration requirements is that 
tight limits on borrowing apply to registered companies.  A mutual fund 
registered under the Investment Company Act62 may not incur indebtedness 
unless it has a minimum coverage of the debt of three hundred percent.63
Coverage of debt is the ratio of the company’s net asset value to the face 
amount of the debt.64  Investment companies also would be prohibited from 
buying securities on margin65 and effecting short sales,66 but the SEC has 
never issued the necessary regulations to implement this provision.  Instead 
the SEC has relied on the more general debt coverage provision to limit 
mutual funds’ indebtedness and short sales.67  The Investment Company Act 
protects registered investment companies and their owners from the risk of 
56 Id. § 80a-22 (covering purchase and sale of shares in the company).  
57 See id. § 80a-16 (covering board of directors and elections). 
58 See id. § 80a-22 (covering purchase and sale of shares in the company). 
59 Id. § 80a-1(b). 
60 Emphasis added.   
61 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b).  See the SEC’s study of the investment company industry that laid the 
foundation for the Investment Company Act.  SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment 
Companies, H.R. DOC. NO. 707 (1939); SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, 
H.R. DOC. NO. 70 (1939); SEC, Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, H.R. DOC. NO. 
279, at 1563-1940 (1939). 
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8 (providing for registration of investment companies). 
63 Id. § 80a-18(a), -18(f) (applicable to closed-end funds and open-end funds). 
64 Id. § 80a-18(h). 
65 Id. § 80a-12(a)(1). 
66 Id. § 80a-12(a)(3). 
67 Guidelines for the Preparation of Form N-8B-1, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,790 (1972) (treating short 
sales and margin purchases as forms of indebtedness or senior securities subject to Investment 
Company Act § 80a-18).   
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debt financing of their investment portfolios68 but simultaneously prevents 
them from reaping the benefits of enhanced economic returns that the leverage 
from borrowing might generate.69
 In order to employ economic leverage through borrowing, organizers 
must structure hedge funds so that the funds do not become registered 
investment companies.70  Although the Investment Company Act does not 
make registration expressly mandatory,71 unregistered investment companies, 
unless exempt from registration,72 may not sell securities,73 including interests 
in themselves.74  While there are classes of specifically exempt investment 
companies that need not register, the classifications are so narrow that they do 
not offer the hedge fund promoter a practical opportunity to avoid 
registration.75  Therefore, their organizers select one of two basic structures 
for the funds that prevent the funds from fitting the investment company 
definition.76  The investment company definition has an operating 
component,77 a manner of offering component,78 and an investor component.79
If the fund avoids either the operating component or both the manner of 
offering and investor components, it is not an investment company.  Hedge 
funds cannot avoid the operating component of the investment company 
definition, as hedge funds are or hold themselves “out as being engaged 
primarily . . . in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities . 
. . .”80
Hedge funds meet the manner of offering and ownership components 
of the exceptions to the investment company definition.  Hedge funds meet 
the limited ownership component of the exceptions to the investment 
company definition.  Section 80a–3(c)(1) (“section 3c1”) funds81 do so by 
limiting the number of the beneficial owners of their shares to one hundred.82
68 Mutual Fund Use of Derivatives, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 952 (1994) (analyzing and 
recommending solicitation of public comment on investment activities of registered 
investment companies in derivative products). 
69 See discussion of leverage infra Part 5. 
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (applying only to registered investment companies).   
71 Id. § 80a-8. 
72 Id. § 80a-6. 
73 Id. § 80a-2(a)(36) (defining “securities” for the Investment Company Act). 
74 Id. § 80a-7. 
75 Id. § 80a-6 (exempting possessions based investment companies that do not sell interests 
outside possession; funds subject to specific alternative regulatory oversight; and funds the 
SEC rules exempt).  
76 Id. § 80a-3. 
77 Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A). 
78 Id. § 80a-3(c). 
79 Id.
80 Id. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A). 
81 Id. § 80a-3(c)(1); see text commencing infra note 109 for a more detailed description. 
82 Id. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A) to (B) (including some special rules for determining beneficial 
ownership). 
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Section 80a–3(c)(7) (“section 3c7”) funds83 do so by limiting their investors to 
qualified purchasers, who — in the case of individual investors — own at 
least $5 million of investments.84
 The manner of offering test prohibits hedge funds from making or 
presently proposing to make a public offering of their securities.85  The 
Securities Act also distinguishes public from non–public offerings of 
securities and whenever there is a public offering imposes registration and 
prospectus requirements on issuers and underwriters of securities.86  A non–
public offering,87 which participants in the securities industry generally refer 
to as a private placement of securities, meets the manner of offering test for 
purposes of the Investment Company Act.88
 The SEC has promulgated a non–exclusive, safe harbor definition of a 
private placement of securities that permits the issuer to sell its securities to an 
unlimited number of accredited investors and no more than thirty–five other 
investors.89  Although it is not the exclusive means for qualification as a 
private placement,90 the safe harbor is simple and practical for the hedge fund.  
The thirty–five purchasers who are not accredited investors need have no 
particular economic qualifications but nevertheless must meet a sophistication 
test.91  The sophistication test requires that the investor have knowledge and 
experience in business matters or the assistance of a representative who does 
have that knowledge and experience.92  If the issuer sells securities to a single 
unaccredited investor, the safe harbor requires the issuer to make many of the 
disclosures that would be necessary in connection with a registered offering.93
On the other hand, there is no specific disclosure requirement under the safe 
harbor if the issuer sells to accredited investors only.94  Accredited investors 
83 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7); see text commencing with infra note 135 for discussion. 
84 Id. § 80a-2(a)(51); see text accompanying infra note 139 for discussion. 
85 Id. § 80a-3(c)(1), -3(c)(7). 
86 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006).   
87 Id. § 77d(2). This section is generally viewed as the private placement exemption.  The 
statute does not use the term “private placement or offering.”  Rather, it exempts from 
registration “transactions by an issuer not involving a public offering.” Id.
88 Id. § 80a-3(c).   
89 Regulation D under the Securities Act.  Securities Act Rule 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508 
(2006). 
90 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) reaches other issuances of securities that do not meet all the conditions 
of the Regulation D safe harbor.  15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–230.508 
(2006). 
91 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2006). 
92 Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(h) (2006) (defining purchaser representative). 
93 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2006). 
94 Id.; Regulation D notes that the anti-fraud provisions do require the issuer to provide 
material information concerning the offering.  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1).  Moreover, if 
proposed regulation § 206(4)-8, supra note 21, becomes final, it will impose broad antifraud 
requirements on all investment advisers, whether or not registered.  As a practical matter, 
hedge fund promoters, on advice of their legal counsel, provide investors with a private 
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purportedly are those who can fend for themselves so that they do not need the 
protections of the Securities Act.  They have adequate sophistication and 
economically are able to bear the loss of their investment.95
 Given the limited number of one hundred investors a section 3c1 fund 
may have if it wishes to avoid the investment company definition,96 admitting 
non–accredited investors diminishes the hedge fund promoter’s opportunity to 
raise capital.  As individuals need have only one million dollars of assets — 
and that amount even jointly with their spouses97 —  or incomes individually 
in excess of $200,000, or $300,000 with spouses,98 to become accredited 
investors, unaccredited investors are not attractive investor candidates.  They 
simply do not have significant capital to invest.  It would be impractical for 
the hedge fund promoter to allocate one of a limited number of investment 
slots to an investor with only very modest wealth.99  Further, the 
sophistication inquiry that would have been necessary in the event of a sale to 
an unaccredited investor is unnecessary in the case of accredited investors.100
And the accredited investor group includes many entities as well, subject to a 
general $5 million asset test.101  In addition, certain individuals who have 
managerial type authority with respect to the issuer also are accredited 
investors,102 as their relationship to the issuer would render any disclosure 
unnecessary, but those investors are more suitable for section 3c7 funds since 
they also may invest in section 3c7 qualified purchaser funds.103  Moreover, 
investment adviser regulations prohibit the investment adviser to the fund 
from charging investors who are not “qualified clients” a performance fee.104
In the case of an individual, a qualified client has at least $1.5 million in 
assets.105
placement memorandum describing and providing other information concerning the hedge 
fund offering, even if the fund is selling only to accredited investors. 
95 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (holding that sale of shares to rank 
and file employees was a public offering not a private placement). 
96 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006); see discussion infra in text accompanying note 109. 
97 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2006). 
98 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2006). 
99 One million dollars is not today what is was when the SEC promulgated Securities Act 
Rule 501(a)(5) in 1982.   
Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers 
and Sales, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982) (effective Apr. 15, 1982).  The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average was under 3000 in 1986 and reached 6000 in 1996.  Moreover, net worth 
includes the value of the equity in one’s owner occupied residence. 
100 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2006). 
101 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(1), (3), (7) (2006). 
102 Securities Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(4) (2006). 
103 See discussion of Knowledgable Employees in section 3c7 funds that otherwise have only 
qualified purchasers as investors infra in text accompanying note 151. 
104 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a) (2006); see discussion infra Part 3. 
105 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d) (2006). 
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A recently proposed rule change would redefine individual accredited 
investors for purposes of hedge funds and similar pooled, but unregistered, 
investment vehicles.  Rather than income or net worth requirements, that 
proposal would classify an individual or the individual and his or her spouse 
as an accredited investor only if the individual or married couple has at least 
$2.5 million of investments.106  Unlike the accredited investor definition with 
respect to which minimum asset requirements remained unchanged for many 
years, the minimum investment amount under the proposed regulation will 
adjust automatically to take account of inflation.107
B. Section 3c1 Funds; Integration 
Until 1997 when Congress authorized section 3c7 funds,108 hedge 
funds failed to meet the investment company definition by limiting themselves 
to one hundred United States citizens or residents as investors.109  Investors 
who or which were neither citizens of nor resident in the United States were 
not counted toward the one hundred limit, as the Investment Company Act, 
like the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, does not protect or regulate the 
activities of non–U.S. persons except insofar as their activities affect U.S. 
persons or U.S. markets.110
 Although accredited investors do not count toward the thirty–five 
purchaser limit for private placements, they do count toward the one hundred 
owner limit for exemption from the definition of investment company 
applicable to section 3c1 funds.111  The rule for counting entities as beneficial 
owners has changed twice to make it more accommodating for hedge funds.112
Unlike registered investment companies that may make only very limited 
investments in other investment companies,113 hedge funds may invest in 
106 17 C.F.R. § 230.216 (2007 proposed) and proposed rule 509, 17 C.F.R. § 230.509 (2007 
proposed), promulgated in SEC Release 33-8766, supra note 21.  The proposed regulation 
includes a definition of investments and excludes the current investment in the fund from the 
computation.  Compare the investment amount based classification of the qualified purchaser 
definitions for section 3(c)(7) funds infra text accompany note 139. 
107 Id. 
108 See discussion of section 3c7 funds that have only qualified purchasers as investors infra in 
text accompanying note 135. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).   
110 Regulation S under § 5 of the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.901-1001 (2006). 
111 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1) (2006).  In measuring the cap of one 
hundred beneficial owners, the promoter or general partner is a beneficial owner, so that the 
fund in fact may admit only ninety-nine investors.   
112 Id. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A).   
113 Id. § 80a-12(d)(1) prohibits investment companies (and their controlled affiliates) from 
acquiring (i) more than 3 per centum of the total outstanding voting stock of another 
investment company; (ii) securities issued by another investment company having an 
aggregate value in excess of 5 per centum of the value of the total assets of the acquiring 
company; or (iii) securities issued by all other investment companies in which it invests 
having an aggregate value in excess of 10 per centum of the value of the total assets of the 
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other hedge funds.  Currently, each entity that owns less than ten percent of 
the voting interests in a fund and each operating, as opposed to investing, 
entity without regard to investment size counts as a single investor.  However, 
all the securities owners in the investor entity are deemed beneficial owners of 
the hedge fund in which the entity invests if the investor entity owns ten 
percent or more of the voting interests in the hedge fund and the investor 
entity is an investment company or would be an investment company but for 
the exemptions for section 3c1 and section 3c7 funds.114  As a result, hedge 
funds investing in a diversified portfolio of other hedge funds115 count as only 
a single investor in each fund so long as diversification limits the investor 
fund to less than ten percent of each fund in which it invests.  On the other 
hand, the rule prevents layering of section 3c1 funds by admitting different 
investor groups into separate funds but having the separate funds invest all or 
most of their its assets into a single fund that conducts the group’s investment 
activities.  This article refers to such groups as “master–feeder” structures.116
Master–feeder structures also raise integration issues that would cause 
multiple hedge fund offerings to be treated as a single offering.117
 In its earlier manifestation, the security holders in any entity that 
owned ten percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of a fund 
counted as beneficial owners of the fund, even if the investment represented 
only a small investment for a large company.118  In that earlier form, the 
provision made it difficult for new funds with limited investor capital to 
acquiring company.  This restriction is explained in § 1(b) of the Investment Company Act as 
a pyramiding problem:  “(4) when the control of investment companies is unduly concentrated 
through pyramiding or inequitable methods of control, or is inequitably distributed. . . .”  
Nevertheless, with appropriate safeguards for governance, the SEC often grants no-action 
relief for master-feeder structures for registered investment companies.  Man-Glenwood 
Lexington TEI, LLC and Man-Glenwood Lexington TEI, LDC, 2004 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 
597 (SEC No-Act. 2004). 
114 Id.  This article refers to funds exempt under Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(c)(7) (2006) as “section 3(c)(7) funds.”  See infra text accompanying note 135 for 
discussion of requirements for § 3(c)(7) funds. 
115 Often industry participants refer to such funds as a fund of funds, a fund structure that is 
not generally available to registered investment companies, supra note 113, unless the 
investment company is sufficiently diversified that it owns no more than 3 percent of any 
other fund and limits its sales charge to 1.5 percent.  15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(d)(1)(F).  The SEC 
grants no-action relief for other fund of funds structures.  The France Growth Fund, Inc., 2003 
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 624 (SEC No-Act. 2003) (no-action relief for investment in 
unregistered, offshore funds).  The SEC also has proposed regulations to permit funds to 
invest temporary cash in money market funds.  Fund of Funds Investments, 68 FR 58226 
(October 8, 2003) (proposing a rule that allows unregistered funds and registered funds to 
investment in money market funds in excess of Investment Company Act § 80a-12(d) limits.)   
116 For a more extensive explanation of master-feeder structures, see infra text accompanying 
note 157. 
117 See discussion infra text accompanying note 121. 
118 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A) (2006), as in effect before amendment by section 102 of the 
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-477 (1980). 
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capture investments from large corporations.  For example, a one million 
dollar investment by a major manufacturing corporation might be less than 
one percent of the corporation’s assets but more than ten percent of the fund.  
In order to accommodate the fund industry, Congress liberalized the rule to a 
ten and ten test, so that a fund would have to look through the investor entity 
to its owners only if the entity met two conditions:  (i) the investor entity 
owned ten percent or more of the fund and (ii) the aggregate amount of the 
investment and similar investments of the entity represented ten percent or 
more of the investor entity’s total assets.119  The current provision retains the 
ten percent of the fund test, (i) above, but substitutes a less inclusive test for 
the ten percent of assets test, (ii) above.  Only if the investor entity is 
investment company–like must the hedge fund include the owners of the 
investor company as beneficial owners of the fund.  The investor company is 
investment company–like if either investing is its primary purpose or, if the 
company invests but investing is not a company’s primary business purpose, 
only if its securities investments exceed forty percent of the value of its 
assets.120
Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds were never retail products sold to all 
who might wish to invest in the market regardless of wealth,121 since the 
minimum investment was so great.  The one hundred investor cap meant that 
the minimum investment unit for a hedge fund had to be substantial in order 
for the assets in the fund to generate adequate fees to enable managers to 
cover operating costs.  In 1996, for example, the average hedge fund investor, 
assuming only U.S. investors in the section 3c1 fund, would have to have an 
investment unit of $5 million for the hedge fund to rival the average mutual 
fund in assets under management.122  Most hedge funds, however, had a 
smaller amount of assets under management than the average mutual fund.  
Managers could increase the number of investors they admitted to the 
fund by marketing the fund to foreign investors.  Non–U.S. investors helped 
fill the investment gap as they are not beneficial owners for purposes of the 
119 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A), before amendment by section 209(a) of the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Title II, Investment Company Act Amendments of 1996, 
Pub. L. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). 
120 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(C). 
121 Recently, some promoters have marketed registered hedge funds as a retail product to 
“qualified investors,” a class of investors having net worth of at least $1.5 million.  See
discussion infra Part 3.  A proposed regulation modifying the definition of accredited investor 
for private investment vehicles effectively would increase the minimum net worth 
requirement to $2.5 million of investments (adjusted for inflation).  Supra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
122  INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2005 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 3, 9 (2005),
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/2005_factbook.pdf/ (showing that in 1996, U.S. some 
6,000+ mutual funds had over $3 trillion in assets.  In 2004, there were approximately 8,000 
active funds with over $8 trillion in assets.  On average, in 1996, a mutual fund had 
approximately $500 million, in 2004 $1 billion under management). 
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Investment Company Act.123  The presence of foreign investors added to the 
hedge fund mystique.  Hedge funds therefore became vehicles for the 
international moneyed community.  Wealthy foreign investors were reluctant 
to expose themselves to even the remote possibility of becoming subject to 
United States jurisdiction of any kind.  As a group, they were especially eager 
to remain free from U.S. taxing jurisdiction.124  Foreign investors shied from 
the United States limited partnerships hedge fund promoters used for their 
United States investors.  Unlike corporations that incur an entity level tax 
followed by inclusion of distributions in the incomes of the corporation’s 
owners,125 partnerships are not taxable on their income.  Rather they are 
transparent for tax purposes.  Their partners must include their shares of the 
partnership’s income in their separate tax computations but there is only a 
single tax at owner level.126  Distributions from the partnership to the partners 
generally incur no further tax.127  Foreign investors eschewed that tax 
transparency and wished to remain free from U.S. taxing jurisdiction.  
Promoters chose to base the funds they designed for their non–U.S. clients in 
low tax jurisdictions that have minimally intrusive regulatory systems.  
Caribbean and United Kingdom island jurisdictions competed for share of the 
investment company market.128  While promoters frequently operated parallel 
funds, one a U.S. based partnership for U.S. investors and the other a foreign 
company for non–U.S. investors, the offshore funds did not exclude U.S. 
investors.  Many hedge funds only operated as foreign companies that offered 
their securities in private placements to U.S. investors.129
123 Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 375 (1997) 
(confirming that non-U.S. persons are neither beneficial owners for section 3(c)(1) funds nor 
need they be qualified purchasers for section 3(c)(7) funds), and compare supra note 110 for 
Regulation S governing offshore offerings. 
124 Because the U.S. is known for the broad reach of its taxation, as it taxes its citizens and 
residents on their worldwide income, non-U.S. persons often become fearful of getting 
trapped in the U.S. taxation web. 
125 See I.R.C. §§ 301-385 (2000) (governing taxation of corporations that are taxable under 
section 11).    
126 See id. §§ 701-777.  Note that investment companies registered under the Investment 
Company Act may enjoy a modified form of tax transparency by means of a corporate 
deduction for dividends paid to shareholders under the regulated investment company rules.  
See id. §§ 851-860L.  For detail on the United States taxation of registered investment 
companies, hedge funds and their owners, see infra Part 4. 
127 I.R.C. § 731 (2000). 
128 For example, a recent visit to the Cayman Islands Monetary Authority website, 
http://www.cimoney.com.ky/section/regulatoryframework/sub/default.aspx?section=PD&id=
666 discloses that some 2750 mutual funds (broadly defined under Cayman Island law to 
include private investment companies) are incorporated or registered (in order to be 
administered) in the Cayman Islands. 
129 For U.S. tax purposes most such funds were passive foreign investment companies (PFICs) 
although some formed as limited liability companies in a variety of jurisdictions and qualified 
as U.S. transparent for tax purposes like partnerships.  See supra note 126 and accompanying 
text.  This followed adoption of the so-called “check the box” regulations in late 1997.  See 
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While managers could offer several funds in order to increase their capital 
under management, integration posed some risk to that strategy.130  Under the 
SEC’s integration concept, the SEC identifies factors it deems relevant in 
determining whether or not to treat two or more offerings as a single offering.  
The factors are:  “whether (1) the different offerings are part of a single plan 
of financing, (2) the offerings involve issuance of the same class of security, 
(3) the offerings are made at or about the same time, (4) the same type of 
consideration is to be received, (5) the offerings are made for the same general 
purpose.131  In addressing the integration question, the SEC considers the 
same factors relevant as it does for integrating securities offerings and adds 
the additional and, possibly determining, factor:   
whether an interest in one partnership would be considered 
materially different from an interest in a second partnership by 
a reasonable investor qualified to purchase both, and that 
relevant to this consideration would be whether the partnership 
had the same investment objectives, the same types of portfolio 
securities, and, particularly, similar portfolio risk return 
characteristics.132
If, for example, a promoter simultaneously marketed two funds with identical 
investment managers, investment purposes, and investor profiles, the SEC was 
and still is likely to consider the two funds to be a single fund with a single 
beneficial owner cap.  By tailoring the investment strategies and markets of 
the various funds under the promoter’s management, promoters could prevent 
integration of the separate funds for Investment Company Act purposes.  Thus 
a fund might focus its activities in debt instruments rather than equities, 
specific industries, or specific regions or countries in order to avoid 
integration with other sponsored funds.  Differing investor profiles also might 
prevent integration of funds.  In one no–action response, the SEC determined 
that it would not integrate a fund marketed to tax exempt investors with a fund 
marketed to taxable investors even though the funds would have identical 
portfolios and managers.133  The fund for the tax–exempt investors was based 
offshore and, in order to prevent realization of debt financed income that 
Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3 (as amended 2006), that allowed most island jurisdiction 
companies to elect U.S. tax transparency as if they were partnerships under subchapter K of 
the Code.  See I.R.C. §§ 701-777; discussion infra Part 4. 
130 The SEC has not promulgated a regulation that specifies when it will deem two or more 
offerings to be a single offering. Guidance on integration takes the form primarily of no 
action letters that delineate facts and circumstances tests for integration.
131 See Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316 (Nov. 6, 1962). 
132 Santa Barbara Securities, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 2390, at *4-5 
(Mar. 8, 1983).   
133 Shoreline Fund, L.P., SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 517, at *6 (Apr. 
11, 1994).   
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otherwise would be taxable to the tax exempt organizations, operated as an 
entity that was not transparent for United States income tax purposes.134
C. Section 3c7 Funds (Qualified Purchaser Funds) 
Despite a sizable investor network that included both U.S. and non–
U.S. investors, the hedge fund industry continued to lobby Congress to 
liberalize the one hundred investor limitation.  In 1996, the industry’s efforts 
enjoyed success as Congress not only diminished the breadth of the investor 
company look–through for section 3c1 funds,135 but also effectively removed 
the one hundred beneficial owner barrier to the growth of the hedge fund 
industry with section 3c7 funds.  As Regulation D permitted sales to an 
unlimited number of “wealthy,” accredited investors because the SEC 
concluded that such investors did not need the full protection of the securities 
laws, so Congress defined a similar new category of purchaser of interests in 
investment pools who did not need the protections of the Investment 
Company Act.  Differences between the underlying regulatory philosophies of 
the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act aside,136 reasons for 
exempting offerings to accredited investors from registration requirements 
under the Securities Act were valid for the Investment Company Act as well.  
Truly wealthy folk do not need protection.  Wealth suggested that the investor 
had the following three characteristics:  (i) the ability to bear the loss from 
unsuccessful, high risk investments, (ii) the sophistication to understand the 
investment opportunity and evaluate its risks and (iii) the bargaining power to 
ask questions and receive answers.137  How much wealth suffices to raise the 
presumption that the investor has the characteristics that eliminate the need for 
various protections differs from ordinary securities investments to investment 
company investments – possibly because unregistered investment companies 
generally incur significant debt. 
 Qualified purchasers are the accredited investors138 of the investment 
company world.139  The qualified purchaser definition uses a $5 million 
threshold for the exemptions it offers.  The definition departs further from 
Regulation D by working from investments, other than the investment in the 
134 I.R.C. § 514; see infra Part 4 for discussion of the treatment of debt financed income for 
tax exempts. 
135 See text accompanying supra note 111. 
136 See discussion supra in text accompanying note 59. 
137 SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 246 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953) (holding that not all employees 
are qualified as private placement purchasers of their employer’s securities and establishing 
standards of (i) information access, (ii) ability to ask questions and receive answers and (iii) 
wherewithal to bear the risk of loss as determinants of individuals to whom non-public 
offerings of securities may be made). 
138 Regulation D under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2006); see supra text 
accompanying note 97. 
139 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2006). 
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hedge fund,140 as its base rather than aggregate assets under Regulation D.  
Individuals141 and family owned entities142 such as family limited 
partnerships143 that own at least $5 million in investments are qualified 
purchasers.  The qualified purchaser definition also embraces an investment 
adviser who makes investments for qualified purchasers and who manages at 
least $25 million.  Similarly, entities that own and invest at least $25 million 
are qualified purchasers.144  Without regard to investor numbers, pooled 
investment funds such as hedge funds owned exclusively by qualified 
purchasers are exempt from registration under the Investment Company 
Act.145  In contrast with the Securities Act private placement safe harbor,146
the presence of a single investor not a qualified purchaser renders the 
registration exemption inapplicable unless another exemption applies.147  The 
SEC may modify Regulation D in response to market conditions, as it recently 
proposed with its special accredited investor definition for investors in private 
investment vehicles,148 since Regulation D is an interpretation of a statutory 
principle rather than a statute itself.149  Conversely, the one hundred beneficial 
owner and qualified purchaser exemptions are statutory so that their specific 
limitations are inflexible.   
At the same time as introducing section 3c7 funds and qualified 
purchasers, Congress directed the SEC to promulgate regulations to allow 
investment in the fund by certain employees without jeopardizing the fund’s 
exemption from the investment company definition.150  By so doing, Congress 
freed up space in many section 3c1 funds and permitted some otherwise non–
qualified purchasers to become investors in section 3c7 funds.  The 
knowledgeable employee exemption was not an altogether new concept.  It 
resembles the sophistication requirement under Regulation D.  Insiders 
140 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(b) (defining investments for purposes of determining whether a 
prospective investor is a qualified purchaser under the Investment Company Act).  Since the 
determination occurs before an investor makes the investment, the $5 million must exclude 
the intended investment in the section 3(c)(7) fund. 
141 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a)(51)(A)(i). 
142 Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(ii). 
143 It is interesting to note the hand of the estate planning industry in the drafting of the statute 
as estate planner frequently use family owned investment entities in order to capture discounts 
in estate value for federal estate tax purposes. 
144 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(iv). 
145 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7). 
146 Regulation D of Securities Act Rules.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006). 
147 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (2006) (reading in part, “[a]ny issuer, the outstanding 
securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such 
securities, are qualified purchasers. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
148 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.216, 230.509 (2007 proposed), supra note 106. 
149 Regulation D interprets § 77d(2) of the Securities Act in light of SEC practice and 
decisional law, including Ralston Purina, 246 U.S. 119, 125-26 (1953). 
150 See National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 
Stat. 3416, 3436. 
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presumably have access to information and understand the nature and extent 
of the investment risk.  The SEC defined the exempted employee group 
functionally by emphasizing participation in the fund’s investment activities.  
So long as the employee’s function is not ministerial and the employee’s 
regular duties involve the investment activities of the fund or the management 
company on behalf of other funds, the employee is a “Knowledgeable 
Employee” whose ownership in the fund is disregarded.151  Executives, 
directors, general partners and advisory board members of the fund or the 
management company are also “Knowledgeable Employees” under the 
regulation.152
 In order to ease the conversion of existing hedge funds to section 3c7 
hedge funds, the 1996 amendments to the Investment Company Act included 
two transitional rules.  One rule permitted existing funds to qualify as section 
3c7 funds while retaining investors who are not qualified purchasers but who 
invested in the fund on or before September 1, 1996.153  The fund may have as 
many as one hundred such investors.154  At the time the fund converts to a 
qualified purchaser fund, those non–qualified investors must have the 
opportunity to redeem all or part of their interests and receive a payment in 
redemption equal to the investor’s proportionate share of the net value of the 
fund’s assets in cash or in kind.155  The rule permitting existing non–qualified 
purchaser investors does not freeze the size of the non–qualified purchaser’s 
investment.  Those investors who are part of the pre–September 2, 1996 group 
may increase their investments in the fund, decrease their investments and 
later increase them again without becoming excluded from that one hundred 
investor group.156  On the other hand, investors who are not qualified 
purchasers may not invest directly in a qualified purchaser fund even if the 
fund has fewer than one hundred non–qualified purchaser owners but may be 
able to invest indirectly through a section 3c1 feeder fund. 
 The second transitional rule facilitates the creation of master–feeder 
fund structures for section 3c7 funds, but not section 3c1 funds, by including 
funds within the qualified purchaser definition.157  With respect to investment 
in section 3c1 funds, as noted above,158 a fund that acquires ten percent or 
more of a section 3c1 fund becomes transparent so that all its owners become 
beneficial owners of the section 3c1 fund and may cause the section 3c1 fund 
151 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-5(a)(4) (2006). 
152 Id.
153 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(i) (2006).   
154 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B). 
155 Id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(ii)((II). 
156 The statute defines the group as those who “acquired any portion of the securities of such 
issuer on or before September 1, 1996.”  Id. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(i)(I).  As the statute reads, an 
investor may remain part of the permitted group even if he or she redeems from the 
investment pool and later invests again. 
157 Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(C). 
158 Supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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to have more than one hundred beneficial owners.159  On the other hand, a 
section 3c1 fund may itself become a qualified purchaser when it invests in a 
section 3c7 fund – even if it invests all or most of its assets in the section 3c7 
fund.160  Provided that all beneficial owners of the section 3c1 fund who 
acquired interests before May 1, 1996 consent to its treatment as a qualified 
purchaser161 and the fund has investments of at least $25 million, the existing 
section 3c1 fund becomes a qualified purchaser.162  As a qualified purchaser, 
it may invest in another fund restricted to qualified purchasers.  
Whether or not Congress intended the result, a fund that becomes a 
qualified purchaser under this election may accept new investors who are not 
qualified purchasers so long as it continues to qualify for its exemption as a 
section 3c1 fund.  Accordingly, a fund that has at least $25 million in assets 
and that may not accept new non–qualified purchaser investors if it converts 
to a qualified purchaser fund163 gains the ability to accept such investors, 
subject to its one hundred beneficial owner limit, by becoming a feeder to a 
new section 3c7 fund.  New qualified purchasers would buy interests in the 
master fund and new non–qualified purchasers enter the section 3c1 fund 
provided it has space under its one hundred investor limitation.  Furthermore, 
if the section 3c1 fund is full, it might move qualified purchaser investors, 
who occupy beneficial owner slots in section 3c1 funds, to direct investment 
in the section 3c7 master fund and free up space in the section 3c1 fund for 
additional non–qualified purchaser investors. 
After the 1996 amendments,164 hedge funds groupings became better–
defined.  A fund group would have a master fund that would do all or most 
investing for the group and two or more feeder funds that would invest all 
their assets in the master fund.  The master fund would be either a limited 
partnership or limited liability company formed under the laws of one of the 
states of the U.S., often Delaware.  Alternatively, the master fund could be an 
entity based in an offshore jurisdiction that elects to be taxed as a partnership 
for U.S. tax purposes so that the entity allocates proportional shares of the 
fund’s income to U.S. investors for U.S. tax purposes.165  In the case of a U.S. 
entity hedge fund, an entity that the investment manager controls would be the 
general partner of the limited partnership or the managing member of the 
limited liability company, so that the manager may receive an allocation of the 
fund’s profits.166  One of the feeder funds that invests all its assets in the 
159 Id. § 80a-3(c)(1)(A). 
160 Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(C). 
161 Id.
162 Id. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A)(iv). 
163 Supra in text accompanying and following note 156. 
164 Investment Company Act Amendments of 1996, supra note 118. 
165 Treasury Reg. § 301.7701-3 (allowing various foreign eligible entities to elect partnership 
tax treatment under subchapter K of the Code); see discussion infra Part 4. 
166 Profit share discussed infra Part 3. 
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master fund might be a section 3c1 fund for non–qualified purchaser–
investors.  Like the master fund, it also would be either a limited partnership 
or limited liability company formed under U.S. law or an entity based in an 
offshore jurisdiction that elects to be taxed as a partnership for U.S. tax 
purposes.  Its general partner or managing member is an entity that the 
investment manager controls.  Another feeder fund might be an offshore fund 
that does not elect to be taxed as a partnership for U.S. tax purposes for 
foreign investors.  The same or another offshore fund that similarly is not U.S. 
income tax transparent would accommodate U.S. tax exempt investors, 
including, subject to plan asset concerns, pension and profit sharing 
accounts.167
Section 3c7 funds have to register under the Exchange Act if they have 
500 or more investors.168  Unlike registration under the Investment Company 
Act that limits use of leverage and capture of incentive fees for the investment 
adviser, the Exchange Act does not restrict the activities of the fund or its 
advisers.  Registration under the Exchange Act does impose reporting and 
public disclosure burdens on the fund and its advisers concerning its 
organization, financial structure, contracts and advisers.169  The Exchange Act 
also requires registered issuers to report current information annually or more 
frequently.170  Most hedge fund managers seek to avoid registration under the 
Exchange Act by limiting the overall investor count to 499. 
III. HEDGE FUND ADVISERS AND INCENTIVE FEES
Investment strategies, leverage, and compliance burdens are not the 
only reasons that hedge fund managers seek to avoid registering the funds 
they manage.  Also management fee restrictions are a key motivator.171  While 
registration is an annoyance, the investment company itself bears the cost of 
reporting and compliance.  Most sizable hedge funds provide their investors 
audited financial statements in any event 172 and funds that are transparent for 
U.S. tax purposes must provide investors necessary tax reporting 
information.173  With limited exceptions, registration precludes the manager 
167 Supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
168 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006). 
169 Id. § 78l(b). 
170 Id. § 78m. 
171 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1) (2006) (prohibiting registered investment advisers from entering 
into fee arrangements that include a share of capital gains), discussed infra in text 
commencing with note 186. 
172 Increasingly, popular offshore jurisdictions like the British Virgin Island now require 
annual audits for hedge funds existing or administered under their laws. 
173 U.S. tax conduits file an annual return and provide their investors K-1s while non-U.S. 
entities generally elect conduit taxation for their U.S. investors and provide the investors 
substitute K-1s to enable the investors to report their shares of the fund’s taxable income and 
loss. 
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from charging fees measured by the advance in the net asset value of the 
fund’s assets.174
 Fees for managers of hedge funds customarily consist of a 
combination of asset–based fees and result fees.175  The manager may receive 
a fixed percentage — generally not more than one to two percent annually, 
with two percent becoming the model — of the assets under management 
without regard to investment success, and an additional amount equal to a 
percentage of the increase in the value of the assets under management — 
generally ten to twenty percent — with twenty percent probably most 
common.176  Ordinarily, in master–feeder fund structures, the investment 
manager charges fees only at one fund level so that an investor in a feeder 
fund does not pay fees directly for the feeder fund and indirectly for the feeder 
fund’s investment in the master fund.  Similarly, hedge funds that invest in 
other hedge funds177 charge smaller fees than do direct investment funds in 
order to limit, but not eliminate, the multiple fees that an investor bears 
through the fund layers.  As explained in the following paragraphs, hedge 
funds sometimes compute fees separately for each investor account in order to 
(i) facilitate differing fee schedules for some investors, (ii) measure 
compensation for referring brokers and investment advisers for capital 
invested, and (iii) coordinate correctly with floor–based — “high water mark” 
— accounting for incentive fees.   
 Fees are negotiable, so that an offering memorandum for a hedge fund 
is likely to reserve the power for the investment manager to modify the stated 
fees for some investors.  In order to avoid confrontation with the bulk of the 
fund’s investors, hedge fund managers tend to contract separately for such fee 
arrangements and do not disclose their details to other investors.  Investors 
making very large investments or investment advisers placing capital in the 
hedge fund for several investors may have the necessary bargaining power to 
negotiate more favorable fees.  Brokers (and some advisers), who sell 
investments in the fund to their clients, may receive a continuing share of the 
fees the client pays to the fund.  For example, a broker bringing a $1 million 
174 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a)(1).  Note, however, that advisers to registered investment companies 
may contract to receive an asset based fee that increases or decreases “proportionately with 
the investment performance … in relation to the investment record of an appropriate index of 
securities prices. . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2).  Those fees, generally fulcrum fees, would be 
available to managers of mutual funds that beat the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index, for 
example.   
175 Nomenclature and tax structure of the fees varies.  Performance, incentive or result fees 
may take the form of an allocation of the hedge fund’s profit in order to capture favorable tax 
characteristics, specifically long-term capital gain for the investment manager. 
176 These percentages vary considerably.  Since hedge funds are not registered investment 
companies, only the marketplace for investment capital and competition among managers 
limits fees. 
177 So-called “funds of funds.”  See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
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investment to a fund might receive ten to twenty basis points178 annually from 
the asset–based fee (so $1 – 2,000 the first year based on a one percent asset 
management fee of $10,000) and an additional 5 percent of the incentive fee 
(another $1000 based upon a twenty percent incentive fee of $20,000 from a 
$100,000 increase in the account value).179
Fund managers frequently look to the asset–based fee for their day–to–
day operating expenses and the incentive fee as their source of profit.  Rarely 
do fund managers return any portion of incentive fees they have collected 
previously when assets decline in value following an incentive fee.  Rather 
managers agree to claim subsequent incentive fees only when the value of the 
investor’s interest exceeds the incentive fee floor or “high water mark.”  The 
floor is the highest value of that investor’s interest upon which the manager 
previously collected an incentive fee.  This floor computational method 
prevents the manager from collecting multiple incentive fees on cyclical 
increases and decreases in value in volatile markets.  The floor, however, does 
not preclude retention of fees attributable to aberrant market spikes since the 
value of an investor’s account is the investor’s share of the net asset value of 
the fund without regard to whether the fund has realized any gain by disposing 
of positions.  As is the case with mutual funds that determine daily value by 
marking their positions to market at market close each day, hedge funds mark 
their positions to market on each fee computation date in order to be able to 
compute the fee.180
To illustrate this principle:  if the incentive fee is 10% of increase in an 
investor’s account value during an accounting period and, due to a market 
spike on the hedge fund’s positions, the value of the investor’s interest 
increases from $10 to $50, the manager will collect an incentive fee of $4, that 
is 10% of the $40 increase.  When the value of the investor’s account declines 
from the succeeding market correction to $20, the investment manager does 
not return any part of the fee even though a refund of $3 might seem 
appropriate – $30 of the value increase not adhering.  But while most 
managers do not refund the excess fee, they agree not to collect any further 
incentive fee until the value of the investor’s interest exceeds the $50 floor.181
To oversimplify fund accounting for the illustration, if one assumes each 
investor’s account is separate, each investor has a separate floor.  An investor 
who withdraws all or part of her invested funds following a decline in value 
eliminates her floor burden for the investment manager.  For example, if the 
178 There are 100 basis points to each one percent. 
179 No standard for these fee-sharing arrangements is readily identifiable but one may assume 
that there is similarity in fee sharing among funds because brokers placing investments with 
several funds will compare arrangements and seek to capture similar and most favorable terms 
for all investments. 
180 See discussion infra at note 184 of illiquid positions and their value. 
181 Since $4 of the $50 is paid to the manager, some managers set the high water mark at post-
incentive fee value so that the high water mark in the example is $46 rather than $50. 
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investor in the above example redeemed one–half of her account and received 
$15, the floor for the remainder of the account would be $25, rather than 
$50.182
The floor method of recapturing historical incentive fees for investors 
described in the previous paragraph generates somewhat perverse incentives 
for the investment manager.  Following a decline in value after incentive fees 
have been collected, new investors, whose floor is the amount invested, 
represent the investment manager’s best opportunity to receive incentive fees 
in the future.  Following a significant decline in the value of the fund’s assets, 
the investment manager may concentrate its efforts on raising new money in 
order to capture future incentive fees rather than focusing its attention on 
actively managing the existing portfolio to regain lost value.  The more radical 
the decline in value, the more likely the manager is to conclude that efforts to 
recapture fund value will be futile.  As occurred following the significant, 
broad market declines in 1998 and 1999, the burden of existing floors were a 
major factor in many investment managers’ decision to liquidate some or all 
their hedge funds and return the remaining capital to the investors.  In that 
way, the managers freed up their time and resources for new and more 
profitable ventures.183
Even though a fund only permits redemptions annually, the fund will 
pay fees to its manager more frequently, usually monthly.  Consequently, the 
fund marks it positions to market monthly in order to compute the fee.  With 
respect to traded securities, there is a market against which to measure value.  
As with mutual funds, hedge funds will value exchange traded securities at the 
day’s close.  But hedge funds may not use the same convention as mutual 
funds for over the counter securities and may select asked prices in order to 
benefit the manager.  Nevertheless, funds predominately seem to use an 
average of bid and asked.  Illiquid positions cause problems for fee 
collection.184  Some managers will collect an asset fee based upon cost and 
defer any performance fee until sale, occasionally requiring a larger 
performance fee for illiquid positions than for liquid securities.  Other fund 
documents will permit managers to estimate the value of the illiquids and 
collect fees accordingly.  In the case of funds that hold illiquid securities only, 
managers invariably collect an asset–based fee measured most often by 
invested capital and defer collection of any performance fee until the fund 
disposes of its positions. 
182 Or $23.  See note 181. 
183 Managers terminating hedge funds because of floors may have found it more difficult than 
earlier to raise capital for their next venture or a new hedge fund.  Interestingly, hedge fund 
investors seem to be rather forgiving of loss in value due to broad market declines that seem 
to defy active portfolio management.  As loss in value is a function of unusual market 
conditions, the investors often are willing to invest with the same manager again. 
184 See discussion of side pockets for illiquid positions supra in paragraph preceding note 34. 
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A. Incentive Fee Exemptions and Registered Advisers 
The opportunity to capture substantial compensation through incentive 
fees may help to attract high quality and creative investment managers to the 
hedge fund industry.  Those managers jealously guard against any fund 
structure that might deprive them of their ability to claim incentive fees.  
Historically, the requirement to register the fund under the Investment 
Company Act effectively prevented the investment advisor from entering into 
a management contract with the fund or any other client that involved the 
payment of a result fee or similar arrangement for the payment of incentive 
compensation.185  Investment advisers186 generally must register under the 
Advisers Act.187  With certain exceptions relating primarily to the wealth of 
the investors to whom or which the adviser renders investment advice,188 the 
Advisers Act prohibits registered and registration required investment advisers 
from contracting to receive compensation that includes a portion of the 
investment gains of their clients.189  However, investment advisers having 
fewer than fifteen advisory clients (and not holding themselves out to the 
public generally as investment advisers) are exempt from registration190 unless 
one or more of the clients is an investment company.191
 Historically, investment advisers to section 3c1 funds relied on the 
fewer than fifteen client exemption from investment adviser registration in 
order to capture incentive fees.192  The advisers limited the number of funds 
they advised to fourteen, treating each advised fund, and not the underlying 
owners of the fund, as a single client.193  Although a section 3c1 fund was not 
an investment company under the Advisers Act,194 it was a client, and no 
general exception to the restriction on incentive fees existed for section 3c1 
185 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(a) (2006). 
186 Id. § 80b-2(a)(11) (defining term “investment adviser” broadly to encompass any person 
“who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising others,…, as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in . . . securities.” 
187 Id. § 80b-3.  Investment advisers who are subject to state regulation, do not advise a 
registered investment company and have less than $25 million under management may not 
register under the Advisers Act.  Id. § 80b-3(a). 
188 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2006); see discussion infra in text commencing 
with note 199. 
189 Id. § 275.205(a)(1) prohibits investment advisory contracts that provide “for compensation 
to the investment adviser on the basis of a share of capital gains upon or capital appreciation 
of the funds or any portion of the funds of the client. . .” 
190 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a)(3) (2006). 
191 Id.  § 80b-2(a)(12) incorporates the definition of investment company under the Investment 
Company Act, that is, a company required to be registered under the Investment Company 
Act.  Id. § 80b-2(a)(12). 
192 Id. § 80b-2(a)(3). 
193  Advisers Act Rule, 15 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2) (2006) (treating entity as single 
client if advisor renders advice to entity based on entity’s investment objectives).   
194 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(12). 
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funds.195  Incentive fees were not a problem for section 3c7 funds, as an 
express statutory exemption permits incentive arrangements for those 
funds.196  After 1996, a registered investment adviser (with or without more 
than fourteen advisory clients) could avoid the incentive fee limit by charging 
the incentive fee at the section 3c7 master fund level only.  Similarly, offshore 
funds that do not have U.S. residents as beneficial owners are exempt from the 
incentive fee limit.197
B. Registered Hedge Funds; Qualified Clients 
Some hedge funds began to resemble the more retail mutual funds as 
early as 1985 when the SEC, exercising its rulemaking authority,198 permitted 
incentive fee contracts for moderately wealthy investors.199  Under the new 
rule, registered investment advisers were permitted to enter into incentive fee 
arrangements with clients who had a minimum investment with the registered 
adviser of $500,000 or $1 million of net worth.200  In the case of a private201 or 
registered investment company,202 the exception to the incentive fee limitation 
applied only if all the owners of the company met the $1 million net asset 
standard.203  The 1985 rule imposed a one–year minimum investment 
requirement for incentive fees and restricted the computational method to 
include unrealized losses whenever unrealized gains were included.204  In 
addition, the rule mandated specific disclosures205 and imposed an arm’s 
length standard on the contract.206
195 Id. § 80b-5(a). 
196 Id. § 80b-5(b)(4). 
197 Id. § 80b-5(b)(5). 
198 Id. § 80b-5(e). 
199 The SEC promulgated Advisers Act Rule 205-3 in Release No. IA 996, Exemption To 
Allow Registered Investment Advisers to Charge Fees Based Upon a Share of Capital Gains 
Upon or Capital Appreciation of a Client's Account.  Investment Company Act Release No. 
996, 50 Fed. Reg. 48,556 (Nov. 26, 1985).   
200 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. 275.205-3(b)(1) (1985).  The 1985 definition overlapped the 
accredited investor definition for individuals under Securities Act Rule 501(a)(5), supra note 
97, and accompanying text, with respect to the asset test but did not include the alternative 
income test of Securities Act Rule § 501(a)(6).  For companies, however, the $1 million net 
asset test was far less demanding than the $5 million test for accredited investors.  Securities 
Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 501(a)(3) (2006). 
201 While section 3(c)(1) funds limited to 100 investors were not investment companies under 
the Investment Company Act, absent an exemption, Advisers Act section 205 prevented 
registered investment advisers from charging incentive fees even to those funds.  
202 Registration of a fund under Investment Company Act § 8 permitted sale of interests to 
more than 100 investors, a product suitable for retail. 
203 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(b)(2) (1985). 
204 Id. § 275.205-3(c) (1985). 
205 Id. § 275.205-3(d) (1985). 
206 Id. § 275.205-3(e) (1985) (requiring adviser believe contract to represent arm’s length 
arrangement). 
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The SEC modified the incentive fee rule substantially in 1998, 
tightening the investor qualifications but removing the various contractual 
restrictions.207  Instead of the $1 million net asset test, the revised rule defined 
“qualified clients” to whom a registered advisor might charge an incentive fee 
to those clients who either have $750,000 under the adviser’s management, 
have net assets of $1.5 million, are qualified purchasers208 or are 
knowledgeable employees of the investment adviser, that is certain of the 
investment adviser’s insiders – managers, officers, discretionary traders, for 
example.209  The SEC explained in its issuing release that the increase from $1 
million to $1.5 reflects adjustment for inflation.210  The 1998 revisions no 
longer required that all investors in a fund that entered into an incentive fee 
contract be qualified clients, so long as those who were not qualified clients 
were not subject to the incentive fee.211
Although statistics on the volume of qualified client funds are not 
available separately from general statistics on registered investment 
companies, it is likely that the number of registered investment companies 
charging incentive fees and marketed to qualified clients grew rapidly after 
1998.  Unlike section 3c1 and 3c7 funds that are exempt from registration,212
registered funds may not trade securities short unless the trades are covered 
with the fund’s own portfolio.213  Similarly, leveraging is not an available 
investment strategy as all registered funds must have three hundred percent 
asset coverage for their debt.214  While some participants in the industry refer 
to qualified client funds as registered hedge funds, those funds do not fit 
cleanly within a hedge fund definition.  They resemble hedge funds with 
respect to advisory fees and tend to engage in a broader and riskier array of 
trading strategies than do mutual funds generally but the resemblance may end 
207 Exemption To Allow Investment Advisers To Charge Fees Based Upon a Share of Capital 
Gains Upon or Capital Appreciation of a Client's Account Release No. IA-1731, 63 Fed. Reg. 
39,022 (July 21, 1998).   
208 Including qualified purchasers may seems unnecessary as anyone with $5 million of 
investments is likely to have net worth of at least $1.5 million but the $5 million investments 
requirement takes into account only acquisition indebtedness and not other indebtedness of 
the qualified purchaser. 
209 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1) (1998). 
210 Part II.B.1 of Advisers Act Release No. IA-1731, notes that 1 million 1985 dollars was 
approximately the same as 1.5 million 1998 dollars.  The SEC, however, has not increased the 
$1 million definition for accredited investor commensurately.  Securities Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.501(a)(5) (2006); supra note 207.  And note the proposed change to the accredited 
investor definition for investors in private investment vehicles that includes an internal 
inflation adjustment.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.216, 230.509 (2007 proposed), supra note 106. 
211 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(b) (1998). 
212 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c). 
213 Guidelines for the Preparation of Form N-8B-1, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,790 (June 9, 1972) 
(treating short sales and margin purchases as forms of indebtedness or senior securities 
subject to Investment Company Act section 18); supra note 67.   
214 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)(1)(A). 
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there.  Incentive fees may be a function of the reputation of the investment 
adviser who exacts the incentive for making its “stock picking” services 
available to moderately wealthy investors.   
Emphasizing the growing importance of hedge funds to the efficient 
functioning of the U.S. capital markets and, in light of that importance, the 
SEC’s need to monitor funds and collect information concerning them in 
order to protect the investing public, the SEC sought to modify exceptions to 
investment adviser registration to compel advisers to register and report many 
of their activities and the activities of the funds they advise.215  The 
modification to the registration requirement was short lived.  The Court of 
Appeals of the D.C. circuit struck down the regulation within a few months 
following the date it became effective.216  If the regulation had been valid, it 
would have modified the definition of client for purposes of the fourteen–
client rule.217  Advisers to section 3c1 and 3c7 funds would have counted the 
underlying owners of the section 3c1 and 3c7 funds as clients, including the 
owners of any fund investing in the client fund.218  It is unlikely that any 
hedge fund manager would continue to have fewer than fifteen clients under 
that revised rule.  With the rule now invalidated, entities, including limited 
partnerships, count as a single client without regard to the number of their 
underlying owners, if the adviser renders advice with respect to the entity’s 
investment objectives and not the entity’s owners.219
IV. TAXATION, RICS, REITS, AND HEDGE FUND STRUCTURE
Mutual funds and real estate investment trusts are partially federal 
income tax transparent.220  The entities elect to have their income taxed to 
their shareholders, rather than to the pooled investing entity itself.  Insofar as 
losses offset the entity’s own income in a taxable year, tax transparency runs 
to losses as well as income, but transparency is not available for net loss as it 
is for net gain.  Both regulated investment companies – mutual funds 
215 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment 
Company Act Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004), supra note 18.  
Registered adviser must adopt policies and procedures and designate a compliance officer.  
The SEC estimated the cost to register, including legal and accounting fees, to be 
approximately $50,000.  Id. at 72064 n. 112.  Registered investment advisers must complete a 
disclosure of concerning personnel, activities and assets under management, as well as their 
policies and procedures to assure compliance with the Advisers Act and the securities laws.  
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.279.1 (2006); Form ADV, available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf.   
216 Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, supra note 19.  
217 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2006) (exempting advisors with fewer than fifteen clients from 
registering under Advisers Act). 
218 Advisers Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2006). 
219 Id. § 275.203(a)(2).   
220 I.R.C. § 851-55 (2006) (governing most registered investment pools). 
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(RICs)221 – and real estate investment trusts (REITs)222 must distribute at least 
ninety percent of their taxable income, other than capital gain income, to their 
shareholders annually in order to escape entity level tax on their incomes.223
A corporate tax burdens all income, whether or not distributed, if the entity 
fails to distribute ninety percent of its ordinary income.224  If the entity passes 
the ninety percent test, the corporate tax reaches only that portion of income 
that the entity does not distribute to its shareholders.225  The entity–level tax 
mechanism that protects the investment entity from the corporate tax is a 
deduction for dividends the entity pays to its shareholders.226 As such, RICs or 
REITs may claim no dividends paid deduction for undistributed income.  
Generally, RICs and REITs distribute substantially all their capital gain 
income and the remainder of their ordinary income to secure full tax 
transparency with respect to income.   
 The dividend to shareholders generally preserves the character of the 
income to the entity.  Capital gain dividends, to the extent of a RIC’s or 
REIT’s net capital gain,227 are long term capital gains to shareholders.228
Dividends a RIC pays out of qualifying dividends it receives are qualifying 
dividends to the shareholders229 and exempt interest dividends are exempt 
interest income to the shareholders.230  Moreover, dividends the entity pays 
after the close of its taxable year revert to the taxable year, as long as the RIC 
or REIT declares the dividend before it timely files its tax return.231  In order 
to avoid having to make actual cash distributions to all shareholders to capture 
221 Id. § 851(a) (defining regulated investment company to include registered investment 
companies under Investment Company Act and other entities). 
222 Id. § 856 (defining REITs). 
223 Id. §§ 852, 857 (2006). 
224 I.R.C. § 852(b)(1) imposes a corporate tax under I.R.C. § 11 for RICs.  I.R.C. § 
852(b)(2)(d) provides a deduction for dividends the RIC pays to its shareholders, and I.R.C. § 
852(b)(3)(A),(B) imposes a corporate tax on the RIC’s capital gain but provides a deduction 
for capital gain dividends the RIC pays to its shareholders.  I.R.C. § 857(b)(1), (2)(B) and (3) 
combined provide the same tax treatment for REITs.   
225 Id.
226 Id. §§ 852(b)(2)(D), 852(b)(3)(B) (RIC deductions for ordinary and capital gain 
dividends);  Id. §§ 857(b)(2)(B), 857(b)(3)(B) (REIT deductions); Id. § 561 (defining the 
dividends paid deduction). 
227 Id. § 1222(11) (defining net capital gain as the excess of net long term capital gain over net 
short term capital loss). 
228 Id. §§ 852(b)(3)(B), 857(b)(3)(B).  Note, however, that net short term capital gain as 
defined in I.R.C. § 1222(5) becomes an ordinary income dividend to the shareholders that is 
not a qualifying dividend. 
229 Id. §§ 854(b)(1)(B), 857(c)(2).  Qualifying dividends under I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B) are 
dividends received that qualified for the reduced rate of tax under I.R.C. § 1(h)(11). 
230 Id. § 852(b)(5)(B). 
231 Id. §§ 855, 858.  I.R.C. §860 permits a deficiency dividend and deduction to eliminate the 
entity level tax, but not the interest on any deficiency, if there is an adjustment in tax liability 
from settlement with the Internal Revenue Service or court proceeding. 
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the dividends paid deduction,232 RICs and REITs offer dividend reinvestment 
programs under which the shareholder may elect to have the fund 
automatically reinvest dividends otherwise payable.  Reinvestment programs 
are simple, generally requiring only checking a box at the time of investment 
for a shareholder to participate.  As RICs and REITs generally offer daily 
liquidity, a shareholder may redeem all or part of the shareholder’s interest at 
any time to receive cash.   
 Real estate mortgage investment conduits (“REMICs”)233 and, from 
1997 to 2004, financial asset securitization investment trusts (“FASITs”)234
facilitated pooling of various debt instruments by treating the holders of the 
interests as direct owners of the underlying asset of the entity.  Accordingly, 
income of a REMIC or continuing FASIT is taxable to the holder of an 
interest as if the REMIC or FASIT were a tax nothing.235
 While Congress has defined specific, transparent tax regimes for RICs, 
REITs, REMICs, and FASITs, domestic hedge funds achieve federal income 
tax transparency by taking limited partnership form.236  Offshore hedge funds 
either elect partnership tax status for U.S. tax purposes237 or agree to provide 
sufficient information to enable their U.S. investors to pay tax currently on 
their shares of the fund’s income through a qualifying electing fund 
shareholder’s election.238  Alternatively, if their U.S. investors are exclusively 
organizations that are exempt from federal income taxation,239 offshore hedge 
funds may elect where necessary to be associations taxable as corporations for 
U.S. purposes.240  The following paragraphs elaborate upon these choices. 
232 Id. § 561 defines dividends paid.   
233 Id. §§ 860(a)-(g). 
234 I.R.C. §860(h)-(l) (1978), repealed by American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-357, § 835, 188 Stat. 1418 (2004). 
235 Compare disregarded entities such as qualified subchapter S subsidiaries under I.R.C. § 
1361(b)(3) and single owner limited liability companies under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-
3(b)(1)(ii), -3(b)(2)(i)(C). 
236 All states provide for limited partnership entities.  Subchapter K of the Code, I.R.C. §701-
77 (2006), governs the taxation of partnerships and other entities, including limited liability 
companies, that are taxed as partnerships under the Code. 
237 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (2006) (assigning partnership tax status to various business 
entities and permitting entities classified as tax partnerships to elect corporate tax treatment 
and some entities otherwise classified as associations taxable as corporations to elect 
partnership tax status – commonly referred to as the “check-the-box” rule). 
238 I.R.C. § 1295 (2006) (providing for the election); Id. § 1292 (2006) (defining the effect of 
the qualified electing fund election). 
239 Id. § 501(a). 
240 Treas.  Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(8) (2006) classifies many foreign entities as corporations and 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) (2006) presumptively classifies foreign entities as partnerships 
only when at least one member does not have limited liability.  Those partnership classified 
entities may elect to be associations taxable as corporations for U.S. tax purposes under Treas. 
Reg. § 301.7701-3(c)(1) (2006). 
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A. Taxable Investors 
Investment partnerships, whether limited or general partnerships, are 
fully transparent for federal income tax purposes.241  Under the partnership tax 
rules,242 the partnership allocates its net income or loss and its separately 
stated items of income and deduction among its partners243 according to the 
partnership agreement.244  Like RICs and REITS, tax transparency preserves 
the character of partnership tax items, as the partners include their shares of 
those items in their individual income computation.245  Items such as capital 
gain,246 both long and short term,247 dividends,248 and tax exempt interest249
that are taxed to individuals and some entities at a lower rate of tax than 
ordinary income retain their preferred tax character as they pass through the 
partnership to the partners.  Unlike RICs and REITs, transparency for 
partnerships extends to losses as well, so that partners may deduct their shares 
of net partnership loss and capital losses250 to the extent of the partner’s 
adjusted basis in his or her partnership interest.251
 Since hedge funds actively trade securities and other positions, rather 
than passively investing in and holding positions for appreciation, many funds 
report their operating expenses as expenses from the active conduct of a trade 
or business.252  As ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses,253 rather 
than investment expenses,254 the investors’ shares of those expenses are not 
241 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (2006) (defining partnership and not distinguishing among general, 
limited and limited liability partnerships).  Liability sharing regulations under Treas. Reg. 
§1.752-2(f) (2006) for example, treat limited and general partners differently from one 
another. 
242 See supra note 236.   
243 A partnership computes its income in much the same manner as an individual.  I.R.C. § 
703 (2006).  The partnership, however, separately states various items of income or deduction 
that, when partners with differing tax characteristics take their shares into account, tax 
outcomes will differ.  I.R.C. § 702(a) (2006).     
244 I.R.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
245 I.R.C. § 702(b), (c) (2006). 
246 Under I.R.C. § 1(h), individuals pay a lower rate of tax on long-term capital gain, as 
defined in I.R.C. § 1222(2), than they do on their ordinary income while corporations do not.   
247 RIC and REIT distributions do not preserve the character of short term capital gain, supra
note 228. 
248 Corporations may claim a dividends received deduction when they receive dividends from 
other corporations under I.R.C. § 243.  Individuals, currently, pay a lower than ordinary 
income rate of tax on many dividends under I.R.C. § 1(h)(11).  I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(11), 243 (2006). 
249 Id. § 103 (exempting interest on state and local obligations from federal income tax). 
250 Id. § 702(a). 
251 Id. § 704(d) (limiting partner’s deductible loss to partner’s partnership interest adjusted 
basis but allowing unlimited carry forward of any non-deductible loss). 
252 Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987) (holding that gambling constitutes a trade or 
business when the activity is sufficiently regular and businesslike).  Hedge funds managers 
distinguish the fund’s activities from passive investing because of the active manner in which 
they trade. 
253 I.R.C. § 162(a). 
254 Id. § 212. 
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subject to the 2% floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions.255  As a result 
of this reporting position, a fund might allocate to an investor both long term 
capital gain and an ordinary deduction in the same year, representing the ideal 
tax combination of income as long term capital gain and expenses as ordinary 
deductions.  However, active trading means short holding periods for 
positions and, accordingly, short– rather than long–term capital gain.  A 
special tax regime governs any commodities positions the hedge fund 
holds,256 including regulated futures contracts, forward contracts, and certain 
equity options.  The statute requires the fund to determine the fair market 
value of those positions at the close of the taxable year under a procedure of 
“marking to market” and to include the unrealized gain or loss in the positions 
in the fund’s gross income, even though the fund has not sold or exchanged 
the positions.257  Under that statute, that gain or loss is sixty percent long term 
capital gain and forty percent short term capital gain without regard to the 
actual holding period of the position.258
 Hedge fund managers generally adopt limited partnership form for 
their domestic funds and elect partnership tax status for their offshore funds 
that have taxable U.S. persons as investors.259  In addition to enabling the 
managers to control the fund by restricting the voting rights of the 
investors,260 limited partnerships and offshore companies taxed as 
partnerships permit (i) the fund to have multiple classes of interests with 
different fees and allocations of income and (ii) the manager to receive 
performance allocations of the partnership’s income rather than fees.  In 
255 Id.  § 67 (limiting deductibility of certain items to amount by which all such items exceed 
2% of taxpayer’s adjusted gross income).  The Internal Revenue Service may challenge this 
reporting position on deductibility but does not seem to have done so as yet.  On the other 
hand, a partnership that takes the position that its trading activities constitute a trade or 
business may find itself unable to prevent reducing its basis in its assets under I.R.C. § 743, as 
amended by § 833(b) of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 188 
Stat. 1418 (2004), when there is a sale of a partnership interest at a loss because an electing 
investment partnership can never have been engage in a trade or business.  I.R.C. § 743(e)(6) 
(2006).  Rarely do hedge fund partnership interests trade, however, as the partnership 
generally redeems the interest of a departing partner, so that the opportunity to prevent 
reduction in basis is relatively insignificant.  The statute applicable to redemptions of interests 
offers no comparable opportunity to prevent basis reduction.  Id. § 734. 
256 I.R.C. § 1256. 
257 Id.  Generally, a taxpayer realizes and recognizes gain or loss and includes the gain or loss 
in gross income only when the taxpayer sells property or exchanges property for other 
property.  I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2006).  The author has argued elsewhere that the realization 
requirement embodied in I.R.C. § 1001 is a constitutional requirement so that I.R.C. § 1256 is 
unconstitutional.  Henry Ordower, Revisiting Realization — Accretion Taxation, the 
Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market, 13 VIRGINIA TAX REV. 1 (1993).   
258 I.R.C. § 1256(a) (2006). 
259 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2), (c).   
260 Limited partners under the revised uniform limited partnership act generally have very 
limited or no voting rights, while foreign companies may issue non-voting shares to investors 
and voting shares to the manager. 
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addition, offshore companies that make the U.S. partnership election may 
admit both U.S. and foreign investors, without providing information to the 
U.S. concerning the foreign investors.261
The partnership agreement (or governing instrument in the case of the 
offshore electing company) controls the allocations of partnership items of 
income and deduction.262  Unless the allocations do not have substantial 
economic effect,263 the allocations under the partnership agreement of items of 
income and deductions for expenses may differ from partner to partner 
without regard to the partner’s capital contribution to the partnership.  Profit 
allocations increase a partner’s capital account balance and allocations of 
deduction or loss decrease a partner’s capital account balance.  As long as 
distributions of money will follow capital account balances when a partner 
redeems a partnership interest and when the partnership terminates, the 
allocation has the necessary economic effect to meet tax requirements.264
Investment partnerships like hedge funds customarily determine the values of 
their investment positions periodically, usually monthly, and allocate changes 
in value from the previous period among the partners.  Advance in value 
increases the partners’ capital accounts and retreat in value decreases the 
partners’ capital accounts. 265  Allocations of tax inclusions and deductions 
that might differ from the book allocations in amount follow the book 
allocations although hedge funds, if permitted, may make a general mark–to–
market inclusion election, so that they may avoid disparity between book and 
tax allocations.266  The election may not be available to the many hedge funds 
261 Domestic partnerships must file Form 1065, partnership information return of income, to 
which it attaches a schedule K-1 for each partner.  Foreign electing entities, on the other hand, 
need not file a U.S. partnership return but must provide to their U.S. owners, the same 
information those owners would have received on a domestic K-1 so that they may correctly 
report their shares of the entity’s tax items. 
262 I.R.C. § 704(a) (2006). 
263 I.R.C. § 704(b).  The intricate Treas. Reg. §1.704-1, -2 (2006) seeks to define and limit the 
concept of substantial economic effect.  In the case of a hedge fund, the income and expense 
allocations define the amount of cash that the partner ultimately will receive from the 
partnership and, therefore, have substantial economic effect. 
264 Treasury reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii) (2006).  The allocations also must be “substantial” under 
treasury reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii), a somewhat more complex concept than economic effect.  To 
oversimplify the concept, if the allocations are not arbitrary but are a function of an economic, 
rather than pure tax driven arrange, the allocations meet the substantiality part of the test. 
265 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f)(5)(iv) (2006) (allowing revaluations of the property of 
partnership that trade securities, commodities, and other related positions like derivative 
products according to industry accounting standards). 
266 I.R.C. § 475(e) (2006) permits taxpayers that trade securities to elect mark to market 
accounting under which they determine the fair market value of their positions at the close of 
the taxable year and include the gain and loss in those positions in income as if they had sold 
the positions for their fair market value at the close of the taxable year.   
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that hold large numbers or value amounts of illiquid positions that they cannot 
mark to market with any significant level of comfort.267
B. Manager’s Compensation in Partnerships 
Rather than receiving a cash payment or an interest in the partnership 
as a fee that would be taxable as ordinary income to the investment 
manager/general partner, the partnership allocates part of its income and book 
gain to the general partner.  Specifically, as the partnership re–determines the 
value of its positions, in the case of a twenty percent performance share, for 
example, the partnership specially allocates twenty percent of the book gain to 
the general partner’s capital account.  On the other hand, the partnership 
allocates book losses among the partners, including the general partner, in 
proportion to the partners’ capital account balances.  Accordingly, the general 
partner receives an allocation of twenty percent of profit but bears only a 
proportional share of loss.   
Since capital accounts determine how much cash a partner will receive 
on liquidation of the partnership, the manager, as general partner, has an 
increasing share in the partnership’s capital.  If the manager wishes to convert 
that interest to cash, the manager may cause the partnership to redeem part of 
the manager’s interest in the partnership.  Rather than the special allocation 
being an ordinary income fee to the manager, the allocation is made up of the 
same types of income as the partnership realizes, some or all of which may be 
long–term capital gain and dividends that may be taxable at lower than 
ordinary income rates in the hands of the general partner.268  General partners 
usually are themselves tax transparent entities – limited liability companies 
and S corporations, so that the general partner’s share of the hedge fund 
partnership’s income is taxable to the general partner’s individual owners.  As 
individuals the owners may capture the lower dividend and long term capital 
gain rates. 
For example, assume the fund has a general partner with a zero capital 
contribution and a twenty percent performance allocation and a limited partner 
who invests $100.  The partnership evaluates its positions at the close of the 
month and determines that there is a gain of $10.  The partnership allocates $2 
to the general partner who now has a capital account of $2 and $8 to the 
limited partner who now has a capital account of $108.  Since a liquidation of 
the partnership following the allocation of that book gain for $110 would 
result in a distribution of liquidation proceeds of $108 to the limited partner 
and $2 to the general partner, the allocation has economic effect for 
partnership tax purposes.269  If no liquidation occurs and, in the next month, 
267 I.R.C. § 475 is only available if the taxpayer can determine the value of its positions 
because of an available trading market.  See discussion of illiquid side pocket positions, supra
in Part 1. 
268 Supra note 243 discussing I.R.C.§ 1(h). 
269 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii). 
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the partnership positions decline $10 in value, the partnership allocates 2/110 
of the loss or $0.18 to the general partner and the remainder to the limited 
partner — $9.82.  Capital account balances are now $1.82 and $98.18 
respectively.  Capital accounts define the partners’ proportional shares for the 
next month’s allocation of further loss and deduction, as well as income until 
the limited partner’s capital account regains the performance allocation 
floor.270  Unless the limited partner withdraws or the partnership liquidates, 
the general partner will receive no further performance allocation until the 
limited partner’s capital account reaches $108 again.  For example, if, in the 
third month, the partnership’s positions advance $10 again, the partnership 
would allocate the first $9.82 to the limited partner to restore the floor.  The 
remaining $0.82, the partnership would allocate $0.16 to the general partner 
(20%) and the remainder to the limited partner.   
 The allocations that the previous paragraph describes are book, rather 
than tax, items.271  The partnership allocates the increase in value based upon 
a book adjustment of its positions before it takes taxable income or loss into 
account.  Any corresponding taxable inclusion or deduction must await the 
disposition of the positions, the change in the value of which generated the 
special allocation and adjustments to the partners’ capital account balances.  If 
in the first example, the partnership’s year closed following the first $10 gain, 
and the partnership recognized $5 long term capital gain on its positions for 
the year, the partnership would allocate that taxable gain $1 to the general 
partner and $4 to the limited partner in order to eliminate the disparity 
between book and tax that the revaluation of the partnership’s positions 
created. 272  The partnership initially would allocate all its ordinary tax 
deductible expenses for the year to the limited partner until the general partner 
received its first special allocation that gave it a capital account.  Then the 
partnership would allocate tax items between the partners in proportion to 
those capital account balances. 273
 Taxation of the general partner who receives a performance allocation 
from hedge or private equity funds recently has become a topic of discussion 
in the press,274 among members of Congress275 and in the academic 
270 See discussion of the floor or “high water mark,” supra Part 3 note 180 and accompanying 
text.   
271 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) (2006) (providing rules for maintenance of capital accounts 
under the regulations). 
272 Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(r)(4)(i) (2006) (applying I.R.C. § 704(c) principles to 
readjustments of capital that create book-tax disparity).    
273 I.R.C. § 706(d) (requiring that partnerships must allocate income and loss to take changes 
in interests during the taxable year into account). 
274 Editorial:  Taxing Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/02/opinion/02mon1.html (arguing that the general partner 
who receives a carried interest in private equity funds should be taxable on the interest as 
ordinary income, rather than capital gain, and noting that Congress has begun to address the 
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literature.276  Those sources suggest that Congress may modify the Code to tax 
those performance allocations as ordinary compensation income, rather than a 
share of partnership income including capital gain.  As noted above,277 the 
partnership currently allocates book income, including unrealized asset 
appreciation that is not yet taxable (and may never become taxable if the 
assets depreciate in value again before the partnership sells them), among all 
the partners.  As part of that book income allocation, the general partner 
receives the twenty percent performance allocation.  When the partnership 
realizes taxable income of all types, especially capital gain, and from all 
sources, it allocates that taxable income among the partners, including the 
general partner, according to the partners’ distributive shares.  Those 
distributive shares take the performance allocation of book income to the 
general partner into account.278
The recent literature argues that taxing performance allocations as 
ordinary compensation income is appropriate for hedge and private equity 
fund managers.279  Taxing as ordinary income, however, will necessitate a 
change in the relatively longstanding rules governing the receipt of a 
partnership profits interest for services.280  Those rules emanate from the 
government’s concession on timing and valuation issues following 
unsuccessful litigation in Campbell v. Commissioner.281  While that decision 
concluded that the interest was taxable if subject to valuation, the court held 
that the interest had no value when the taxpayer received it.282  The outcome 
of non–taxability allowed taxpayers in many cases, not limited to hedge and 
private equity funds, to convert what otherwise would be ordinary income 
from their services into income from property, often capital gain.283
issue.  The editorial implies, mistakenly, that the capital gain is all long term taxable at a 
maximum 15% rate.).   
275 Id.  
276 Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty:  Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 
Colorado Law, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper Number 06-27 (Revised 
Mar. 11, 2007) (referred to in the New York Time editorial supra note 274 and arguing that 
the current structure of taxing partnership profits interests for services permits the conversion 
of income from human capital into capital gain and arguing that altering that tax treatment 
would be a compelling and justifiable tax change). 
277 Text accompanying supra notes 268-273. 
278 I.R.C. § 704(b). 
279 Fleischer, supra note 276. 
280 Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343 (treating the receipt of a profits interest for services as 
non-taxable when received, unless certain exceptions rendering valuation simple and 
straightforward apply). 
281 943 F.2d 815 (8th Cir., 1991) (holding that the profits interest in a partnership the taxpayer 
received for services is not taxable because it has no ascertainable value). 
282 Id.
283 I.R.C. § 83 (governing taxability of property, including a partnership interest, that a 
taxpayer receives for services and fixing a single point in time for valuation and inclusion of 
the property in income). 
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The concession in the revenue procedure284 produced a tax rule that 
was administrable but theoretically unsound.285  Rather than investing in a 
partnership with assets or money that had been taxed before the partner used 
that capital to invest in the partnership, as other partners do, partners who 
received only profits interests for services invest with untaxed service 
income.286  A change in the rule makes sense.  Any new rule may be 
inconsistent with the general operation of partnership taxation.  If a new rule 
is consistent with other partnership tax rules, on the other hand, it will prove 
more complex in practice than the current discussion anticipates.  Receipt of 
the interest will attract a tax on the ordinary income from services equal to the 
value of the interest received.  Later, unless the new rule also restructures the 
partnership’s allocations, the manager also will be taxed on the manager’s 
share of the underlying partnership income as the partnership realizes it – 
effectively taxing the income from the same partnership source twice.287
Given Congress’ unwillingness to enact legislation that diminishes benefits 
for hedge and private equity funds and their managers,288 the change in the tax 
rules may not find its way to the top of the congressional agenda. 
C. Tax Exempt Investors, Unrelated Business Taxable Income, and 
Foreign Investors 
Among hedge fund investors are many U.S. tax–exempt organizations 
for which hedge fund partnerships do not work quite right.  Tax exempt 
organizations, whether of the charitable varieties289 or retirement plans,290 are 
generally free from federal income taxation on their investment income.  
However, exempt organizations are taxable on any unrelated business income 
284 Rev. Proc. 93-27, supra note 280. 
285 Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 TAX LAW. 19, 
34-38 (1992) (arguing that if valuation is impractical upon receipt of the interest, the 
transaction should remain open for tax purposes and taxed as valuation becomes practical or 
as the partner receives payments).  And Fleischer, supra note 276, reviews much of the 
extensive literature on the issue. 
286 Ordower, supra, note 285. 
287 Id. at 38.  The second tax as the general partner receives a distributive share under I.R.C. § 
702 will increase the general partner’s adjusted basis in the partnership interest (I.R.C. § 705) 
that will compensate for the second level of tax through a smaller taxable gain or a taxable 
loss on disposition of the partnership interest. 
288 See supra text following note 17. 
289 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (relating to charitable, educational, religious, etc. organizations that are 
generally exempt from federal income taxation).  
290 Pension and profit sharing plans under I.R.C. § 401, educational and charitable 
organization employee plans under I.R.C. § 457, and non-Roth individual retirement accounts 
under I.R.C. § 409 are generally exempt from federal income taxation under I.R.C. § 501(a).  
Hedge funds generally monitor retirement plan investment in order to remain under the 25% 
plan asset limit, lest the fund manager become a fiduciary under ERISA.  Department of 
Labor Regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-101.  See Shartsis Friese, U.S. Regulation of Hedge 
Funds, supra note 38, at 249-265. 
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they may have.291  Debt–financed income is unrelated business income.292
Income from hedge fund partnerships that borrow in order to leverage their 
investment capital293 is debt–financed income to the extent of the borrowing.  
As with all partnerships, the partnership’s income retains its character in the 
hands of its partners.294  Accordingly, debt–financed income to the partnership 
retains that character as the partnership allocates it to the exempt organization.  
If it invests in the partnership, a tax exempt organization’s share of the 
partnership’s debt financed income would be subject to the unrelated business 
income tax.   
Hence from the tax exempt investor’s perspective a corporate 
investment vehicle that is not transparent for federal income tax purposes is 
preferable to a partnership.  Neither dividends that the exempt organization 
receives from the corporate fund nor gain on the redemption or sale of the 
corporate fund’s shares is unrelated business income to the exempt 
organization investor.  The income and gain to the exempt organization is tax 
exempt, even if the corporate fund incurs substantial amounts of debt in the 
course of investing. 
 A U.S. corporation is not the best choice for the hedge fund because 
the corporation itself will attract a federal income tax on its profit from its 
investing and trading activities and thereby lose part of its investment return to 
the income tax.  So long as state law or the exempt organization’s own 
governing documents do not prohibit offshore investments, exempt 
organizations capture their most favorable tax position by investing in 
offshore hedge funds.  Even if the offshore fund is a feeder fund that invests 
its capital into the U.S. master fund, the offshore fund is still the better choice 
for exempt organization investors.  This is so as long as the offshore fund, if 
an eligible entity, does not elect U.S. partnership status for tax purposes.295
 An offshore hedge fund is not a U.S. person for federal income tax 
purposes, since it is a company formed in and governed by the laws of a 
foreign jurisdiction.296  Under U.S. tax law, offshore corporations need not file 
federal income tax returns,297 unless they engage in a trade or business in the 
United States and derive income that is effectively connected with that U.S. 
trade or business.298  Even if the foreign corporation maintains an office in the 
United States that is the source of its trading activity, trading securities or 
291 I.R.C. §§ 511(a) (imposing a tax on unrelated business income), 512(a)(1) (defining 
unrelated business taxable income). 
292 I.R.C. § 514 (including that percentage of income from property in unrelated business 
taxable income as equals percentage of debt financing of property).   
293 See infra Part 5, however, for use of derivative products for leverage that may not 
constitute borrowing. 
294 I.R.C. § 702(b) (2003). 
295 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b) (2006). 
296 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30) (2006). 
297 I.R.C. § 6012(a), flush language and Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(2) (2006). 
298 I.R.C. § 882 and Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-2(g)(1). 
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commodities for its own account does not constitute a U.S. trade or 
business.299
Most income of a foreign corporation that is not effectively connected 
with a U.S. trade or business of that corporation remains free from U.S. 
income tax.  Non–effectively connected gain that a non–U.S. person realizes 
from the sale or exchange of securities or commodities, even if sold on a U.S. 
exchange and even if stock in a U.S. corporation, is foreign source income to 
a non–resident and not subject to U.S. tax.300  The United States collects a 
withholding tax at the payment source for many periodic payments from 
United States sources to a foreign entity.  Source withholding applies to 
interest, dividends, and royalties that non–U.S. persons receive from U.S. 
sources.301  It also applies to gain from the sale of intellectual property where 
payments are a function of the property’s productivity,302 and to the proceeds 
from the sale of U.S. real property interests.303  Exceptions for interest from 
bank deposits304 and portfolio interest305 leave little interest income subject to 
the withholding tax.  Since capital gain from securities and commodities 
trading and portfolio interest constitute the bulk of the offshore hedge fund’s 
income, the fund would pay little or no U.S. income tax. 
 If the offshore fund is a feeder to the U.S. master partnership, 
partnership tax rules preserve the character of the partnership’s income in the 
hands of the offshore partner.306  Preserving character complicates the 
offshore corporation’s tax status, since the partnership claims to be in the 
299 I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(ii) (excluding trading securities and commodities 
respectively for one’s own account from the U.S. trade or business definition).  Like the 
introduction of section 3(c)(7) funds, supra part 2, in 1997, Congress liberalized this trade or 
business exception to accommodate the hedge fund industry.  Before amendment by section 
1162(a) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, a securities trading 
corporation with its principal office in the United States was engaged in a trade or business in 
the U.S.  Treas. Reg. § 1.864-2(c)(iii) sets forth ten criteria (that participants in the hedge fund 
industry referred to as the “Ten Commandments”) to determine whether or not the corporation 
had its principal office outside the United States.  This rule led U.S. hedge fund managers to 
establish their bases of operation offshore – with a commensurate loss of revenue to states, 
like New York and Connecticut, where they have had their offices since the 1997 change. 
300 I.R.C. § 865(a)(2). 
301 Id. § 871(a)(1) (30% withholding for individual recipients); Id. § 881(a)(1) (30% 
withholding for corporate recipients).  Tax treaties with most industrialized countries reduce 
the withholding tax on dividends and many royalty payments to 10% or less, but the treaty 
reductions rarely apply to the low-tax jurisdictions in which hedge funds have their residence.  
See id. §§ 1441, 1442 for the withholding obligation imposed on the payer. 
302 Id. § 871(a)(4) (30% withholding tax on the gain).  
303 Id.  § 1445 (10% withholding tax at the source on the proceeds from the sale of U.S. real 
property interests, as defined in I.R.C. § 897(c)).  Foreign corporations may elect to treat 
income from U.S. real property interests as a trade or business under I.R.C. § 882(d), so that it 
may file a return and claim deductions for the expenses, including depreciation. 
304 Id. §§ 871(i)(1), 881(d). 
305 Id.  §§ 871(h), 881(c). 
306 Id. § 702(b).  See discussion supra in text accompanying note 294. 
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trade or business of trading securities or commodities in order to position its 
U.S. individual partners to deduct their shares of expenses free from the 2% 
floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions.307  If engaged in a trade or 
business, the partnership must withhold on any foreign partner’s share of 
partnership income,308 and not just on periodic income subject to withholding 
at the source.309  While not free from doubt, the specific income sourcing rules 
should override the partnership’s general trade or business characterization.310
With respect to the offshore corporation, as long as the partnership is a trader, 
as opposed to a dealer, in securities or commodities, the corporation through 
the partnership is not engaged in a U.S. trade or business.  Accordingly, 
income from the partnership is not effectively connected with a U.S. trade or 
business.  Income from the partnership is subject to withholding at the source 
only to the extent of the periodic payments withholding rules discussed 
above311 and not the more far reaching partnership income withholding.312
Gain from trading in securities and commodities is not taxable to the offshore 
fund.  Neither the fund, nor its non–U.S. person and exempt organization 
investors are taxable on the offshore fund’s share of the master partnership’s 
income from trading securities or commodities.   
D. Manager’s Compensation Deferral Offshore 
Operation of offshore hedge funds with only tax exempt and foreign 
investors offered U.S. based hedge fund managers the opportunity to defer 
significant amounts of their compensation without cost to the fund.313  The 
manager was not currently taxable when the hedge funds, rather than paying 
the fees to the manager, contributed all or part of the manager’s fees to a trust 
for the manager’s benefit.  Deferral of compensation was possible because the 
trust’s assets remained subject to the claims of the fund’s creditors.314
Commonly referred to as a “rabbi trust,” the manager did not have to include 
the trust’s assets in income until the trust released them to the manager or, if 
earlier, the fund’s creditors no longer had a claim to them.  U.S. corporations 
307 Id.  § 67.  See discussion supra in text accompanying note 255. 
308 Id.  § 1446 (requiring payment by a partnership of a withholding tax on a foreign partner’s 
share of the partnership’s effectively connected income). 
309 Id.  § 881. 
310 Id.  § 864(b)(2), supra note 299 and accompanying text.  
311 Id. §§ 871, 881, supra note 301 and accompanying text. 
312 Id. § 1446, supra note 308 and accompanying text. 
313 See Henry Ordower, A Theorem for Compensation Deferral:  Doubling Your Blessings By 
Taking Your Rabbi Abroad, 47 THE TAX LAWYER 301, at Part III.E. (1994) (discussing 
offshore application of rabbi trusts). 
314 The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that, as long as the service recipient’s creditors 
may reach the funds, no transfer has occurred for purposes of I.R.C. § 83 (governing the 
timing and amount of inclusion in income and deduction on transfers to a person other than 
the payer for the benefit of a service provider).  Accordingly, the service provider has no 
compensation income because a transfer is necessary to the inclusion.   
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commonly use rabbi trusts to defer compensation for top corporate managers, 
but the cost to the corporation of providing the benefit is deferral of its 
compensation deduction until the managers include the rabbi trust assets in 
their income.315  Unlike taxable U.S. corporations, however, offshore hedge 
funds were ideal candidates for the use of rabbi trusts because they were 
indifferent to the compensation deduction – not being subject to U.S. income 
tax in any event.  Recent changes in deferred compensation rules severely 
restricted use of offshore rabbi trusts,316 and imposed strict guidelines on 
domestic use of such deferral arrangements.317
E. Passive Foreign Investment Companies 
Offshore corporations that serve as acceptable investment pools for tax 
exempt investors are passive foreign investment companies (“PFIC”) for U.S. 
tax purposes.318  Before the Department of the Treasury introduced elective 
tax classification of entities in 1997,319 taxable U.S. investors did invest in 
offshore hedge funds even though they were PFICs.  While PFIC status has no 
impact on tax exempt U.S. investors,320 it affects taxable U.S. investors 
adversely by classifying some gain the U.S. shareholders might receive from 
the investment as ordinary income rather than long term capital gain.  It also 
imposes an interest charge on certain distributions from the funds and gains 
recognized from the sale of interests in those funds.321  The interest charge is 
designed to offset the deferral benefit the taxpayer otherwise would capture 
because the corporation’s income is not subject to U.S. taxation and the 
shareholder not taxable until receiving a distribution on or selling the shares.   
U.S. investors may avoid both the interest charge and the ordinary income 
treatment by electing a current inclusion in income of their shares of the 
PFIC’s income each year.322  This qualified electing fund election323 causes 
the U.S. shareholder to include a proportional share of the fund’s income each 
year.  Imputation of the fund’s income to the shareholder separates the PFIC’s 
net capital gain from its other income,324 preserving net capital gain as long 
term capital gain to the shareholder in much the same manner as a RIC 
315 I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006). 
316 Id. § 409A(b) (added by section 885(a) of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-357 (Oct. 22, 2004)). 
317 I.R.C. § 409A(a). 
318 I.R.C. § 1291-98.  
319 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3. 
320 See discussion supra commencing with the text accompanying note 289. 
321 I.R.C. §1291(a) (imposing ordinary income tax and an interest charge on distributions 
from a PFIC and gain from the sale of PFIC shares). 
322 Philip S. Gross, Tax Planning for Offshore Hedge Funds – the Potential Benefits of 
Investing in a PFIC, J. OF TAX’N OF INVESTMENTS 187 (2004). 
323 I.R.C. § 1295 (requiring the U.S. taxpayer to elect and the PFIC to agree to provide 
information necessary to the electing taxpayer’s reporting). 
324 I.R.C. § 1293(a)(1). 
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does.325  Unlike a RIC, no actual distribution is necessary to carry the income 
to the shareholder and the shareholder’s adjusted basis in the RIC increases by 
the amount of the inclusion.  The PFIC may distribute amounts to the 
shareholders without further tax equal to the income on which the 
shareholders paid tax under the imputation.  Since the imputed inclusion in the 
shareholders’ income is a function of the PFIC’s net income,326 offshore 
hedge funds with taxable U.S. investors are not suitable for deferral of the 
manager’s compensation through a rabbi trust.  Current deduction for 
compensation is valuable to the U.S. shareholders because the deduction 
diminishes taxable income to the shareholders. 
V. INVESTMENT POLICIES AND LEVERAGE
Hedge funds tend to emphasize specific investment strategies in which 
their managers have or claim expertise.  A reporter for the hedge fund 
industry327 identifies seven main categories of hedge funds:  (1) event driven, 
(2) global, (3) global/macro, (4) market neutral, (5) sectors, (6) short sellers, 
and (7) long only.328  Briefly, event driven strategies follow specific types of 
events, corporate takeovers, for example, and invest either to capture an 
arbitrage profit in anticipation of the event or in the debt or equity securities 
emerging from those events.  Global funds emphasize investment in securities 
of non–U.S. issuers and may feature specific world regions, emerging 
markets, or specific countries.  Sectors funds focus on specific business 
sectors, biotechnology, for example.  Long funds invest for appreciation in 
value, as do equity mutual funds generally.  In the retail markets, registered 
investment companies, including both mutual funds and registered qualified 
client funds,329 specialize as well in each of those investment strategies:  event 
driven, global, sectors, and long only funds.  In addition, hedge funds may 
invest in a portfolio of section 3c1 and 3c7 hedge funds.  Subject to 
diversification requirements for registered funds, registered investment 
companies also might invest in section 3c1 and 3c7 funds.330
325 See RIC discussion supra at note 224 and accompanying text. 
326 I.R.C. § 1293(a), (e) bases the imputed income on the company’s current earnings and 
profits, computed under I.R.C. §312.  Because of the tie to earnings and profits, the PFIC’s 
ordinary earnings include any tax exempt income that the PFIC may have converts into 
taxable income in the shareholders’ hands. 
327 Managed Account Reports LLC publishes MAR/Hedge, available at 
http://www.marhedge.com/, (a report on hedge fund activities, and identifies seven basic 
hedge fund categories). 
328 See William Fund and David A. Hsieh, A primer on hedge funds, supra note 38, at 319, for 
explanation of the various strategies.  Similarly, Bankim Chadha & Anne Jansen,  supra note 
17, at 27, 29. 
329 See discussion supra in text accompanying and following note 199. 
330 Investment Company Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(c), (d) (2006).  See discussion at note 5 and 
The France Growth Fund, Inc., 2003 SEC No-Action Letter. LEXIS 624, supra note 115. 
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 Global/macro funds, on the other hand, emphasize specific risk factors, 
such as stock indices, currencies, and commodities.  They may take large, 
directional positions where managers conclude that governmental intervention 
in a country or region is inconsistent with macroeconomic conditions so that a 
shift is likely to occur.  For example, a country may peg its currency 
unrealistically to a specific exchange rate with the dollar, allowing macro 
funds to anticipate an exchange rate adjustment when the markets will not 
sustain the governmental decision.  Market neutral funds use long–short and 
arbitrage strategies.  Short–sellers trade on predictions of loss in the value of 
securities.  These last three categories of investment strategy involve 
investment activities that necessarily include short selling and, therefore, 
generally are unavailable to the registered investment company industry 
because short selling involves exposure to debt that investment company 
regulation limits.331
 Among other characteristics, leverage from borrowing distinguishes 
section 3c1 and 3c7 hedge funds from registered investment companies.  As 
registered investment companies, mutual funds and qualified client funds may 
not incur debt unless the fund has net assets with value at least three times the 
amount of the debt.332  Although the SEC has not promulgated regulations 
implementing the specific prohibitions of margin purchase of securities and 
short selling,333 the SEC views both margining and short selling as limited by 
the general net asset coverage requirement.334  If they properly disclose their 
investment policies and risks, mutual funds may employ leverage freely as 
long as they capture leverage without incurring debt.  The SEC has expressed 
concern about the fund volatility that emanates from the extensive use of 
various derivative products that create no debt–like obligation but magnify 
gains and losses.335
 Leverage magnifies gains and losses thereby rendering the investment 
more volatile than an investment without leverage.  Both borrowing336 and 
331 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18.  See note 334 infra. 
332 Id. § 80a-18(a) (applicable to closed-end funds); Id. § 80a-18(f) (applicable to open-end 
funds). 
333 Id. § 80a-12(a). 
334 Guidelines for the Preparation of Form N-8B-1, 37 Fed. Reg. 12,790 (1972) (treating short 
sales and margin purchases as forms of indebtedness or senior securities subject to Investment 
Company Act § 18). 
335 Mutual Fund Use of Derivatives, supra note 68. 
336 For a simple illustration of the leverage through borrowing concept, consider the following 
examples.  If one borrows $100 for one year and must repay $105 (5% interest) at the end of 
the year but can invest the $100 so that the borrower receives 6% return on invested funds, 
$106 at the end of the year on the $100 investment, after repaying the debt, the borrower has a 
net gain of $1 on a zero investment.  On the other hand, if the investment yields only $104 at 
the end of the year, the borrower must provide $1 from her own funds in order to repay the 
lender – a loss of $1 on a zero investment.  If the borrower borrows the $100 and invests her 
own $100 as well, borrowing has increased a 6% return to a 7% return.  That is, the 
investment yields a 6% return on $200 -- $12 plus return of the original invested funds.  After 
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positions in derivative products337 create leverage and fund volatility. On a 
large scale, positive leverage can enhance the return from a successful 
investment radically, but negative leverage from the unsuccessful, leveraged 
investment rapidly diminishes investors’ capital.  The volatility that large 
amounts of leverage cause increases the risk profile of an investment.  
Investors in hedge funds (and mutual funds) rarely are willing to assume 
personal liability for losses in excess of their invested capital, yet, both debt or 
investment leverage can cause unanticipated and sometimes immediate loss of 
the invested capital.  
 The SEC applies the general investment company limitations on 
debt338 to derivative products that create financial obligations, including 
futures contracts, forward contracts, and the writing, as opposed to the 
purchase,339 of an option.340  Those guidelines permit registered investment 
companies to invest in positions that impose a possible future payment 
obligation on the investment company, as long as the investment company 
segregates enough of its assets to cover the obligation.  Like a short sale 
against the box,341 the segregated account sets aside funds as necessary for the 
repaying $105 to the lender, the borrower has $107 left.  On the other hand, in the 4% return 
example, the borrower has decreased a 4% return to a 3% return ($208 less $105 repayment 
leaves $103).  A larger borrowing, i.e. greater leverage, say $900 at 5% plus the out of pocket 
$100, a 6% return on the $1000 investment yields $1060 at the end of the year, leaving the 
investor with $115 after repaying $945 for a return leveraged from 6% to 15%, but a 4% 
return yields $1040 leaving the investor with only $95 after repaying the $945 for a negatively 
leveraged return of -5%, a loss of $5 out of pocket. 
337 Derivative products are positions that are not ownership of an underlying tangible or 
intangible property but that change in value relative to the change in value of the underlying 
property.  For example, equity options are derivatives and provide an easily understood form 
of leverage.  Assume an investor with $100 who may purchase for the $100 either (i) 1 share 
of XXX Corporation stock or (ii) an option to purchase 200 shares of XXX Corporation stock 
at the current market price of $100 per share.  In the case of the option, the original $100 is 
the option premium paid to the option writer for selling the option to purchase referred to as a 
call option.  If the stock price advances $10, a purchase of 1 share produces a 10% return.  If 
the investor purchased the option, however, the investor will be able to buy 200 shares for 
$100 per share and sell them immediately for $110 each, netting $2000 less the option 
premium $100 for a return of $1900 or 1900%, quite a difference achieved through 
leveraging.  On the other hand, if the XXX Corporation shares remain at $100 per share, the 
share purchaser loses nothing, but the option purchaser loses 100% of her investment – she 
will not exercise the option and loses the option premium. 
338 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18 (2006). 
339 The option writer has an obligation to deliver the subject of the option in kind or settle in 
cash with the purchaser of an option, while the purchaser’s obligation ends with payment of 
the option premium.  The purchaser of an option has no obligation to exercise the option. 
340 Securities Trading Practices of Registered Investment Companies, Release No. 10666, 
1979 SEC LEXIS 1744 (SEC 1979).   
341 Short sale against the box refers to a short sale when the short seller holds the same 
securities in its portfolio and could use the portfolio securities to return the borrowed 
securities if necessary.  A short sale is the sale of borrowed securities in the expectation that 
the securities will have declined in value when it comes time to return the borrowed 
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cover.  The investment company must fund the segregated account with high 
grade liquid securities, such as government bonds, and cash.  It also must 
mark the risk position to market daily, so that the investment company may 
adjust the amount in the segregated account to cover any decline in the value 
of the position.342  Segregation limits the amount of debt–type leverage the 
investment company may employ by making the segregated funds unavailable 
for any other purpose.   
 No similar limit applies to leverage that involves no future obligation, 
like a purchased option, for example.  However, disclosure of the investment 
policy and risk may be necessary in the fund’s prospectus and other public 
documents.343  Further, derivatives that do not trade on an established market 
may involve significant counterparty risk.344  Where an established trading 
market exists, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, for example, the market 
operates as a hedged intermediary that standardizes the contractual terms and 
serves as the counterparty on all market traded contracts.345  In the case of 
over the counter contracts, there may be no hedged intermediary as the 
contract counterparty or the hedged intermediary that is the counterparty may 
become unable to collect on cash settlements owed to it.  In either instance, 
and despite requirements for collateralization from its counterparties, the 
counterparty may not meet its obligations under the contract, especially 
following sudden market movements adverse to the counterparty’s investment 
strategy.  Most often, however, the counterparty will be an established and 
reliable financial institution that remains perfectly or nearly perfectly hedged 
securities.  The short seller then may purchase replacement securities on the market for a 
lower price than that for which the short seller sold the borrowed securities.  That differential 
between the short sale price and the cover purchase price is profit to the short seller.  If, 
however, the underlying security increases in value, rather than decreasing as the short sale 
anticipates, the short seller has to buy the cover at a price higher than the short sale price, and 
that purchase will cause an overall loss.  If the seller has portfolio securities for cover, the 
seller is protected from having to buy the securities at the higher price on the market.  
Generally, tax rather than economic strategies precipitate a short sale against the box since 
economically, if one anticipates decline in value, one may lock the current value by selling the 
portfolio securities. 
342 Securities Trading Practices, supra note 340, in section SEGREGATED ACCOUNT, note 
15 and text. 
343 Id at note 18 referring to the registration statement under section 80a-8(b) of the 
Investment Company Act, reports to shareholders under section 30, sales literature under 
section 24(b), and proxy statements under section 20. 
344 Counterparty refers to the other party to a two party derivative contract. 
345 Exchanges issue offsetting positions, so that when one position retreats in value, the 
offsetting position advances in value in an equal amount leaving the issuer protected (hedged) 
against loss.  Commodities futures exchanges require purchases of position to post margin and 
to increase their margin deposits whenever their positions decline in value.  Margin is amount 
slightly greater than the excess of the obligation of the investor over the current value of the 
position, that is, margin exceeds the amount the investor would have to pay if the investor 
closed out the position by purchasing an offsetting position currently.  Margin protects the 
exchange from the financial failure of the investor. 
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on its derivative positions.  It functions much like a commodities futures 
exchange as a facilitator and receives a fee, rather than an investment return, 
for serving as a derivative contract intermediary.  It establishes procedures to 
monitor the values of its positions and the collateral that counterparties have 
posted with it.  Nevertheless, its financial stability is never quite so firm as 
most of the established options and futures exchanges.  
 No similar constraints on leverage apply to section 3c1 and 3c7 funds.  
They may borrow directly, subject to any limitations that other regulatory 
agencies may impose on lenders or derivative counter parties.  In the United 
States, the Federal Reserve Bank, the Comptroller of the Currency, or state 
regulators may impose lending limits on regulated financial institutions’ 
lending practices.  However, those regulations only indirectly operate on the 
hedge funds.  Indeed the hedge funds may be able to establish different types 
of credit arrangements with a variety of lenders, thereby maximizing the 
hedge funds’ access to credit.  Likewise, those hedge funds may take 
derivative positions without regard to whether the positions impose a future 
obligation on the fund.  The only controls on hedge funds’ derivative exposure 
are (i) internal, voluntary controls, if any, designed to prevent the fund from 
taking excessive risk and failing and (ii) the willingness of derivative counter–
parties to enter into contracts with the hedge fund.  Hedge fund managers who 
have strong reputations, like Long Term Capital Management had in 1998,346
have the ability to take investment positions through derivatives and direct 
borrowing that have exposure many times the amount of their invested capital. 
Part 6.  Conclusion – Additional Regulation Needed? 
 As part 2 of this article demonstrated, the fundamental structure of the 
Investment Company Act, the Securities Act, and the registration 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act enable hedge funds to avoid the 
regulatory framework of those laws.  The statutory design of those Acts and 
the regulations that the SEC has promulgated interpreting those statutes reflect 
Congress’s and the SEC’s conclusion that certain investors need neither the 
protection that registration offers nor the more parental limitations on 
investment activity and advisory fees that the Investment Company Act and 
the Advisers Act offer to the public.  Congress confirmed and expanded the 
exemptions from registration when it introduced section 3c7 funds for 
qualified purchasers in 1997347 and exempted their advisors from advisory fee 
limits.348  The SEC further facilitated creation of a type of registered fund for 
moderately wealthy investor that could operate free from advisory fee 
restrictions.  Antifraud rules suffice to protect the wealthy investing public 
that forms the market for hedge funds.  As they do with all other transactions 
in securities, whether or not exempt from registration, antifraud rules outlaw 
346 See discussion of Long Term Capital Management, supra note 7. 
347 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2006). 
348 15 U.S.C. § 80b-205(a)(4) (2006). 
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market manipulation and require disclosure of material information even 
when the security in question is an interest in a hedge fund.349  Little if any 
evidence suggests that registration should be expanded to protect sophisticated 
and wealthy investors.350  On the contrary, registration impedes the flexibility 
that such investors may wish to have in their selection of investment structures 
suitable to the investors’ own risk tolerances.  And both Congress and the 
Internal Revenue Service have accommodated tax laws and their 
interpretation to the needs of the private investment company community.  
The SEC’s recently proposed regulation that would impose stringent 
disclosure standards on advisers to hedge may serve to enhance investor 
protection in this area.351
 Similarly, increased regulation of hedge funds does not seem the 
correct course for control of leverage risk.  If necessary, increased regulation 
of investors in and lenders to hedge funds would address that concern more 
directly.  If lenders are at risk because they extend too much credit to hedge 
funds, lending limits and similar regulatory controls — some possibly already 
in place but suffering from lax internal and external enforcement352 — 
targeted to the lenders seem more appropriate.  If some municipal 
governments, public corporations, or pension plans should not invest in hedge 
funds, for others hedge funds might be a perfectly acceptable and 
appropriately controlled portion of their portfolios.  Beyond inquiring whether 
or not investors meet basic qualified purchaser requirements,353 the 
government agency regulating the investor’s primary industry sector, the 
investing corporation’s board of directors, or the investing pension fund’s 
managers would be the most suitable targets for regulation because they know 
the investor that is at risk far more intimately than a hedge fund manager can.  
Requiring hedge funds to monitor the solvency and investment mix of their 
investors is impractical.  The funds do not have and cannot at reasonable 
expense obtain and analyze their investors’ portfolios.   
 Perhaps the existing statutory framework to prevent and sanction 
market manipulation inadequately controls the activities of hedge funds.  
Increased transparency that would have accompanied registration of 
investment advisers354 and, in the future, possibly hedge funds themselves 
under a separate registration regime, unaccompanied by parental limitations 
on investment activities or fees, may have helped to prevent market 
349 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
350 Accord Sharma, Sunil (1998). “Regulation of Hedge Funds,” in Hedge Funds and 
Financial 
Market Dynamics. Occasional Paper Series 166. B. Eichengreen, D. Mathieson 
(Hrsg.). Washington DC.: International Monetary Fund, S. 62; see Dissent of Commissioners 
Glassman & Atkins, supra note 18.   
351 Proposed regulation § 206(4)-8, 17  C.F.F. § 206(4)-8 (2007 proposed), supra note 21. 
352 Compare Sunil Sharma, supra note 350, at 67-8. 
353 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) (2006). 
354 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (2006), held invalid in Goldstein v. SEC, supra note 19. 
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manipulation by hedge funds.  Hedge funds may have significant market 
power because of their ability to raise both equity and debt capital.  If hedge 
funds have sufficient market power to generate significant market movements, 
integrity and stability of the markets may depend in part on access to 
information concerning the positions hedge funds hold and trade.  Hedge fund 
managers are understandably opposed to and suspicious of governmental 
intervention into their activities that have remained free from regulation for 
many years.  Regulation certainly would have increased the costs of operating 
hedge funds, but the SEC concluded that the compliance cost that it recently 
sought to impose upon hedge fund advisers was not great relative to the 
amount of funds under management.355  Managers differed the SEC with 
respect to cost assessment and prevailed in the courts.356
A greater concern for managers may have been that information 
reporting would provide access to the managers’ investment strategies and 
portfolio management techniques that the managers consider to be proprietary 
information.  Compromise of their trade secrets might cost some managers 
their ability to remain as successful as they are.  That concern seems 
legitimate although it may be only a smokescreen.  Perhaps managers feared 
that investors with greater access to information would learn that many hedge 
fund managers have no great talent for investment management.  In order to 
raise capital, some managers may have relied upon the hedge fund mystique 
that secrecy created.  Once the mystery would disappear, their ability to corral 
investors may have disappeared as well.   
355 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 18, at 
72,080-1 (estimating compliance costs at approximately $50,000).  But see Dissent of 
Commissioners Glassman & Atkins, supra note 72, at 72,095, for a much higher estimate of 
compliance costs. 
356 Goldstein v. SEC, supra note 19 (holding the regulation counting clients and requiring 
registration of many hedge fund advisers invalid). 
